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THE EVOLUTION OF ADOLESCENCE:
A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & THOMAS GRISSO*"
INTRODUCTION
The legal response to juvenile crime is undergoing revolu-
tionary change, and its ultimate shape is uncertain. The tradi-
tional juvenile court, grounded in optimism about the potential
for rehabilitation of young offenders, has long been the target
of criticism, and even its defenders have been forced to ac-
knowledge that it has failed to meet its objectives.1 Beginning in
the late 1960s, when the Supreme Court introduced procedural
regularity to delinquency proceedings in In re Gault,2 courts and
legislatures began to slowly chip away at the foundations of the
juvenile justice system. Recent developments have accelerated
and intensified that process, as policy-makers at both the state
and federal level respond to public fear and anger at what is
perceived to be an epidemic of youth violence, including an
alarming increase in juvenile homicide. Increasingly, critics of
University Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
Professor of Psychiatry (Clinical Psychology), University of Massachusetts Medi-
cal Center. Both authors gratefully acknowledge the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation for its support of this project. This paper was presented at
the Symposium on New Directions in Juvenile Justice at the University of Pennsylva-
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I Irene Merker Rosenberg, LeavingBad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 165-66.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
' The first wave of reform after Gault focused on extending procedural rights toju-
venile defendants. More recent innovations have been driven by social control con-
cers. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
'For a discussion of state legislative response and proposed federal legislation, see
infra notes 46-54. The increase in violent juvenile crime is well documented, al-
though it has leveled off in the past few years. Between 1989 and 1993, arrests ofju-
veniles for murder rose 45%, for robbery 37%, and for aggravated assault 37%.
OFFIcE OF Juv. JusT. AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONICJUVENILE OFFENDERS 1
(1995) (citing FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1994)) [hereinafter GUIDE]. See also Eric
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the traditional juvenile justice system argue that young offend-
ers should be subject to the same punishment as adults for the
harms they cause.5 The next step, which many are quite ready
to take, is to abolish the separate juvenile justice system.
One way to think about the evolution of legal policies re-
sponding to youthful crime is in terms of the empirical account
of adolescence that is expressed through these policies. From
this perspective, the traditional (pre-Gault) juvenile court was
shaped in important ways by a conception of errant youth as
childlike, psychologically troubled, and malleable. 6 On this
view, the job of the court was not to punish, but to rehabilitate
and protect its charges. With the reform movement of the
1970s and 1980s, a less idealized view of adolescence emerged,
together with a growing skepticism about the potential for re-
habilitation.7 Immature youth were seen as less culpable than
adults, but not as blameless children. Lacking experience and
judgment, young offenders needed lessons in accountability. A
perusal of the current landscape of juvenile justice reform sug-
gests a view of delinquent youth as appropriately subject to adult
punishment and procedures and thus as indistinguishable in
any important way from their adult counterparts. 8
Our aim in this essay is to examine these changing accounts
through a developmental lens, with a purpose of bringing into
the policy debate on juvenile justice reform the insights of de-
velopment psychology. This perspective is useful in providing a
scientific measure of the empirical assumptions, intuitions, and
predictions about adolescence that have always played a large
role in policy formation in this context. The framework chal-
lenges two assumptions underlying the contemporary punitivist
Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the Problem of Serious
Juvenile Crime: A Case Study in Texas 1973-1995, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 563, 564 (1996)
(positing link between legislative actions and referral rate for juvenile homicide that
increased 171% from 1985-92); THE STUDY OFJUVENIE JUSTICE REFORM, REPORT OF
THE VIRGINIA COMM'N ON YOUTH TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, House
Doc. No. 37, at 14-15 (1996) [hereinafter REPORT OFTHEVA COMM'N ONYOUTH] (dis-
cussing juvenile violence and homicide rate). For further discussion, see infra note
150 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of recent state and federal initiatives to process and punish young
offenders as adults, see infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
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reforms. The first is what might be called the "competence as-
sumption:" that no important differences distinguish adoles-
cents and adults charged with crimes. Modem developmental
psychology provides substantial, if indirect, evidence that ado-
lescent choices about involvement in crime and their decisions
as defendants in the legal process reflect cognitive and psycho-
social immaturity. This evidence challenges contemporary ju-
venile justice policies which discount the importance of
conventional notions of criminal responsibility and constitu-
tional requirements for fair proceedings (neither of which the
critics challenge directly).
The second premise implicit in the recent reforms might be
labeled the "utilitarian assumption." It qualifies the compe-
tence assumption in holding that, even if developmental differ-
ences do distinguish adolescent and adult offenders, the
enormous social cost inflicted by young criminals requires that
those differences be ignored in formulating a legal response to
youth crime. This assumption is challenged by evidence derived
from taxonomy of adolescent delinquent behavior,9 which ex-
plains much about the nature of adolescent criminal conduct
and clarifies the importance of differentiating among young of-
fenders. The modem punitivist reforms tend to treat adoles-
cent offenders as though most are young career criminals-a
premise that is true of only a small group of offenders whose de-
linquency in adolescence is part of a persistent pattem of anti-
social behavior, often beginning in early childhood. The
criminal activity of most adolescents, in contrast, reflects a rela-
tively typical inclination to engage in antisocial behavior during
this developmental stage-a tendency that desists with matur-
ity.10 Thus, policies that focus solely on the harm caused by
youthful offenders may not be the optimal means to achieve the
instrumentalist goals of their proponents. These policies fail to
calculate the long-term social costs of categorical punishment,
particularly the costs incurred by diminishing the prospects for
productive adulthood of those offenders whose delinquent be-
havior reflects transient developmental influences.
9 This taxonomy was developed by Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life Course
Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL REV. 674 (1993).
'0 See infra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text.
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In combination, the developmental lessons produce a coun-
terintuitive insight about the relationship among immaturity,
culpability and criminal persistence, that has not yet been rec-
ognized in the formulation of juvenile justice policy. Youths
who offend at a younger age (and who are thus less mature and
less culpable) may be more likely to become adult career crimi-
nals than teens who first initiate even serious antisocial behavior
in mid-adolescence or later. This observation poses a formida-
ble challenge to the development of fair and effective policies
responding to youth crime. It suggests that juvenile justice pol-
icy must attend to patterns of delinquent behavior and not sim-
ply to the severity of the offense, and it contributes to our
conclusion that a developmental model of juvenile justice
should incorporate both rehabilitative and retributive dimen-
sions.
The following roadmap may be helpful. In Part I, we will
briefly sketch the changing conceptions of adolescence that
have been reflected in the evolution of juvenile justice policy
over the past century. In Part II, we present a developmental
framework. First, we describe the role of antisocial conduct in
adolescent development, and sketch the taxonomy, which in-
cludes two rough categories of youthful criminal behavior: "ado-
lescent-limited" and "life-course-persistent."11 We then offer a
positive account of developmental factors that may influence
decision-making in ways that distinguish adolescents from
adults. Finally, we apply this framework, examining the impact
of developmental factors on decisions to engage in criminal
conduct and on decisions in the criminal process. In Part III,
we explore the possible implications of developmental knowl-
edge for criminal blameworthiness, and conclude that devel-
opmental psychology evidence supports a presumption of
youthful diminished responsibility for younger and mid-
adolescents. We then examine through a developmental lens
" To break down patterns of youthful criminal conduct into two categories is an
oversimplification. Some research indicates that there are several paths to adult
criminal careers. See, e.g., Daniel Nagin & Kenneth Land, Life Course Trajectories of Dif-
ferent Types of Offenders, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 111 (1995) (identifying four trajectories: no
convictions; adolescent limited; high-level chronic; and low-level chronic).
" These include both cognitive factors-reasoning and understanding-and fac-
tors that contribute to judgment, as this term is used in common parlance-peer in-
fluence, risk preference, and temporal perspective. See infra notes 75-104 and
accompanying text.
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the utilitarian argument that societal protection necessitates se-
vere penalties for youthful offenders. This perspective clarifies
that punitive policies may poorly serve the efficiency goals of
their supporters. In Part IV, we examine the lessons of the de-
velopmental perspective for juvenile justice policy and suggest
some directions for policy that is formulated in a developmental
framework.
I. CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON ADOLESCENCE INJUVENILEJUSTICE
REFORM
In this Part we describe accounts of adolescence as reflected
in juvenile justice policy during three periods in the last cen-
tury. Each period, in its way, was one of reform-a time in
which existing legal policy toward youth crime was challenged
by a new conception of adolescence and adolescent crime. The
first was the period of Progressive reform early in the century;
the second was the post-Gault period of the 1970s and 1980s;
and the third is the contemporary period.
A. THE TRADITIONAL COURT
The creation at the turn of the century of a separate system
of juvenile justice, committed to rehabilitation of young offend-
ers, was a product of the social reform movement of that pe-
riod . It also reflected the late 19th century understanding of
the nature of crime and a new recognition of psychological dif-
ferences between youths and adults, which was emerging from
the "new" science of psychology.1
4
The focus on rehabilitation came in part out of a concep-
tion of criminal conduct as a symptom of an underlying condi-
tion that required treatment, rather than as bad conduct
warranting punishment. This approach to crime influenced
," For a discussion of that reform movement, see JANE ADDAMS, THE SPIRIT OF
YOUTH AND THE Cri STREETS (1972) (original edition published in 1909); see alsoJACI
HOLL, JUVENILE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1971).
14 See generally ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERImENT (1978); Sanford Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspectiv 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
" A pioneer of the movement, Judge Julian Mack, acknowledged that one of the
main principles underlying the Juvenile Court is that "the child offender... should
receive at the hands of the law a treatment differentiated to suit his special needs;
that the courts should be agencies for the rescue as well as the punishment of chil-
dren." Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 115 (1909). He main-
tained that the fundamental concern of courts towards the juvenile offender should
1997]
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the sentencing reform of the late 19th century, generating inde-
terminate sentencing policies that dominated adult criminal
corrections for more than a century. 6 Juvenile offenders, be-
cause they were young and malleable, were believed to be ide-
ally suited to a regime grounded in rehabilitation. 7 Injuveniles,
the "condition" that required treatment was caused by poor pa-
rental guidance, care and supervision as well as social harms as-
sociated with poverty. 1
Although the Progressive conception of youth included the
modem understanding of adolescence as a separate develop-
mental stage, and of adolescents as "not fully formed" persons, 9
the Progressive reformers tended to describe young offenders in
more childlike terms.0 As Judge Ben Lindsey, a prominent
early reformer, put it, the criminal prosecution of youth was an
"outrage against childhood., 2' Lindsey argued that "our laws
against crime were as inapplicable to children as they would be
to idiots. 2  In part, this characterization may have reflected a
tendency to exaggerate the differences between adult and
be "what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his in-
terest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career." Id. at 119-
20.
" See ANDREW VON IRSCH, DOINGJUSTICE 32 (1976) (criticizing the broad discre-
tion accorded to judges under this system); Richard Bonnie, Trends in JuvenileJustice
Reforn, in DIAGNOSIS AND DEBATE 168, 171 (Richard Bonnie ed., 1977) (describing
criticism of the medical model); Barry Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the
Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471,
473-78 (1987) (describingjudicial discretion under Progressive sentencing reforms).
17 Martin Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing
Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 323, 324-35
(1991). Thus, the reformers envisioned that clinicians would be an integral part of
the juvenile court clinic, and that physical and psychological evaluations would de-
termine the child's problems and needs. See Mack, supra note 15, at 119-20.
" See CHARLES LARSON, THE GOOD FIGHr: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BEN B. LINDSEy 34
(1972); MURRAY LEVINE & ADELINE LEVINE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HELPING SERVICES 155-
229 (1970); BEN B. IaNDSEY & HARVEYJ. O'HGINS, THE BEAST 82-83 (1909).
"JOSEPH KE=T, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERNCA-1 790 TO THE PRESENT
(1977).
2 This point is driven home by the writings of two early reformers, Judges Julian
Mack and Ben Lindsey. See LARSON, supra note 18; Mack, supra note 15, at 115;
LiNDSEY & O'HIGGINS, supra note 18, at 85. Judge Mack consistently refers to offend-
ers as children or boys (occasionally girls), often utilizing the term "child offender."
Mack, supra note 15, at 115. Lindsey describes the "delinquent child" as "misguided
and misdirected." LARSON, supra note 18, at 34. Lindsey's illustrative stories often in-
volved young boys. See also LEVINE & LEVINE, supra note 18, at 219-22.
21 See LINDSEY & O'HIGGINS, supra note 18, at 85.
2Id at 133.
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youthful offenders, by advocates seeking to underscore the ap-
propriateness of a more lenient legal response to youth crime.
Moreover, the reformers, in fact, may have been imagining
younger offenders. The jurisdiction of juvenile courts in the
early years ended at age fourteen or sixteen, and the real victory
for reformers was that children between the ages of seven and
fourteen were no longer tried as adults.23
Under the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice, the im-
maturity of young defendants was important, for several rea-24
sons. Juvenile offenders were assumed to have different
capacities and needs from adults (in part due to youthful vul-
nerability and dependence) that warranted separate adjudica-
tory procedures and a differential correctional response.' The
reformers also believed that the criminal acts of youthful of-
fenders reflected their immaturity; thus, juveniles were not
criminally responsible and should not be subject to the same
punishment as adults.26 Neither the retributive or deterrent
23 See Mack, supra note 15, at 108; LARSON, supra note 18, at 34. See also Andrew
Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 505-06
(1984) (describing the common law infancy defense and its presumed irrelevance in
the traditional juvenile court).
24 See generally Mack, supra note 15, at 119-20; Forst & Blomquist, supra note 17, at
324-25.
'Judge Ben Lindsey described young offenders as "needing aid, encouragement,
help and assistance." LARSON, supra note 18, at 34. See also Barry Feld, The Transforma-
tion of the Juvenile Court, 75 MIN. L. REV. 691, 694 (1991) ("[b]y the end of the nine-
teenth century, children increasingly were seen as vulnerable, innocent, passive, and
dependant beings who needed extended preparation for life"); Thomas Grisso et al.,
Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court, 10 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHmARY, 1 (1987) (the ju-
venile justice system developed in the late nineteenth century "in response to society's
growing recognition of the special needs of errant juveniles"); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-
Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile
Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1097 (1991) ("The desirability, even necessity, for a sepa-
rate court system to address the problems of young people appeared obvious, given
the newly emerging view of the adolescent as an immature creature in need of adult
control.").
26 See, e.g., FANKLIN E. ZIMRNG, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCE CE 36
(1982) ("The child's immaturity was viewed as outweighing crime control considera-
tions in determining appropriate responses to young persons who violated the law.");
Martin P. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to Be Punished: Some Implications of
Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. Ray. 182, 191 (1989) ("The juvenile court move-
ment assumed that young people under an articulated statutory age (sometimes as
high as 21 years of age) are incapable of rational decision-making and thus lack the
capacity for moral accountability assumed by the punitive model.").
19971
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purposes of the criminal law were appropriately served with this
27group.
The qualities that were presumed to make juveniles less re-
sponsible than adults were not generally articulated with any
precision. Since retribution is generally justified on the ground
that criminal acts represent the free and rational choice to "do
the bad thing,, 28 a rejection of retribution implicitly reflected a
view that juveniles were developmentally unable to make this
choice. Some observers pointed to the impulsiveness and mal-
leability of youth as traits that were the basis of limited criminal
responsibility.2 Impulsiveness presumably contributes to inca-
pacity because it impedes the ability to weigh the consequences
of behavior, while malleability might make juveniles vulnerable
to bad influences, particularly from peers.30
The rehabilitative approach of the traditional juvenile court
presumed that state intervention could have either negative or
positive effects on youthful offenders, and it emphasized the
importance of preserving the future prospects of young offend-
ers.3' The Progressives, however, did not maintain that criminal
conduct reflected developmental influences that would attenu-
ate with age. Rather, the belief was that the delinquent youth
was on a path to a criminal career, from which he could be di-
verted, through rehabilitation, or toward which he would pro-
ceed without appropriate intervention.
Lee Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and Standards, 1991 BYU
L. REv. 351, 361 ("Minors were said to lack the degree of maturity necessary to sup-
port firm judgments about their own culpability .... Nor could general deterrence
be effective for young people who lacked a fully developed capacity for reasoning
about costs and benefits supposed by that justification for punishment."); Forst &
Blomquist, supra note 17, at 324 ("Underlying the Progressives' reform agenda was
the assumption that minors.., needed to complete their cognitive, social, and moral
development before being expected to shoulder the burdens of adulthood.").
'8 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
29 Forst & Blomquist, supra note 17, at 325.
so In the reformers' minds, parents were often the culprits, mostly in failing to pro-
vide positive influence, thus leaving vulnerable children susceptible to the influences
of peers. See LINDSEY& O'HICGINS, supra note 18, at 82-83.
" See State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 299 (N.H. 1985) (stating that the purpose of
the juvenile justice system is to shield children and to "prevent attachment of the
'stigma of a criminal' by reason of conduct resulting from immature judgment")
(quoting United States v. Fotto, 103 F. Supp. 430, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)).
' See Mack, supra note 15, at 109-10.
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B. REFORMS IN THE WAKE OF GAULT
In the years since In re Gaul?' extended to juveniles in de-
linquency proceedings many procedural rights accorded to
criminal defendants, both the procedures and purposes of the
juvenile court have been radically reformed. In part, the
changes grew out of mounting skepticism about the empirical
premise that rehabilitation was effective with youthful offend-
ers.34 The reforms also reflected a growing belief that juveniles
are more like adults than the traditional model recognized, and
that young offenders should be held accountable for their of-
fenses.& Focus on the seriousness of the offense rather than the
needs of the youthful offender came to dominate the sentenc-
ing regime in many jurisdictions.
In the post-Gault period, policymakers grappled with the
challenge of constructing. a retributive system that recognized
the youth and immaturity of juvenile offenders. The reformers
of the 1970s and 1980s thought that youths were more likely to
offend than adults, and attributed high crime rates among juve-
niles to psychological and biological factors associated with this
developmental stage.3 6 Under the post-Gault model of juvenile
justice, juveniles were held responsible for criminal acts because
they had sufficient moral judgment and capacity for self-control
to justify this response.37 Moreover, adolescents needed to learn
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
'4 The reforms also grew out of a view that juvenile defendants got "the worst of
both worlds," asJustice Fortes said in Gaul4 receiving neither the promised rehabilita-
tion ofjuvenile court nor the procedural rights of adult defendants. Id. at 19 n.23.
Skepticism about rehabilitation grew, in light of the disappointing outcomes in
juvenile corrections programs and the high recidivism rates among juvenile offend-
ers. INSTITUTE OFJtUDICIAL ADMINISATION: ABA JUvENL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Stan-
dards Relating to Dispositions, Introduction (1982) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
The Supreme Court, in extending procedural protections to juveniles charged with
crimes, expressed skepticism about this premise of the rehabilitative model of juve-
nilejustice. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-19.
" Many states have revised the basis of their dispositional response to juveniles'
criminal conduct from rehabilitation to retribution and accountability. See infra note
45 for a discussion of post-Gault legislation in Washington and other states.
The importance of developmental influences on youth crime is reflected in the
report of a task force of the Twentieth Century Fund, an important reform initiative
of the late 1970s. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS: CONFRONTINGYOUTH CRIME 3 (1978).
Zimring performed a background study for the Task Force's report on sentencing
policy.
*,7Id at 7. A premise of the retributive approach is that minors of an age that they
are likely to engage in criminal behavior have a capacity for moraljudgment. Other
1997]
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to take responsibility for their choices, in preparation for adult-
hood.38 However, because of youthful immaturity, the criminal
choices of juveniles were seen as less culpable and thus as de-
serving less punishment than were those of adults.39 Thus, dis-
positional duration could be linked to age, because age was
presumed to be linked to criminal responsibility.40 Differential
treatment of adults and youth was also justified as a means to
preserve the child's future options, a goal that presumed that
delinquency did not necessarily presage adult criminality.
41
commentators have made this point. Walkover, supra note 23, at 543 ("adolescent
children may be generally regarded as possessing the capacity to be culpable, al-
though quite often not at the level one would expect of a mature adult"). The Juve-
nile Justice Standards, the most prominent reform project of the period, adopted a
retributive approach to juvenile dispositions through proportionate and determinate
sanctions based on the seriousness of the offense and fixed at the time of disposition.
Under the Standards, sentences were shorter than those imposed on adults. See ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 34.
ZIMRING, supra note 26, at 7. Zimring argues that adolescence is a probationary
period for adulthood, and that the goal of criminal intervention with youth should be
to teach lessons in accountability. Zimring describes adolescents as having a
"learner's permit" for adult life. Id. at 89-90. He argues that teens often make bad
decisions (such as decisions to get involved in criminal activity) because of immature
judgment and inexperience. Id. at 92. Sanctions should instruct about the negative
consequences of such choices by holding young offenders responsible. Id. at 95-96.
'9 Thus under the Juvenile Justice Standards, juvenile sentences were shorter in
duration than criminal sentences. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 34, Juvenile Delin-
quency and Sanctions 5.2, commentary at 42. An express purpose of the Standards is
to devise a delinquency code that "recognizes the unique physical, psychological, and
social features of young persons in the definition and application of delinquency
standards." Id. at 1.1, commentary at 3. The Twentieth Century Task Force also takes
this approach. ZIMRING, supra note 36, at 7.
'0 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 34, at 2.1, commentary at 35. See also id. at 1.1,
commentary at 19 n.5 (quoting Fred Cohen, Position Paper (Juv. Just. Standards Pro-
ject, No. 18, 1974)).
A correctional system for juveniles also should contain prospective elements, at-
tempts to promote the development of individual responsibility for lawful behav-
ior on the part of offenders by providing opportunities for personal and social
growth. The importance of this prospective element reflects the traditional legal
perception of the physical dependence of the very young and the slow, slow pro-
cess of intellectual and emotional maturation during adolescence .... Juveniles
may be viewed as incomplete adults, lacking in full moral and experiential devel-
opment.
Id. at 19.
" As Franklin Zimring comments: "The two most plausible justifications for sepa-
rate treatment of adolescent offenders are the social value of giving young offenders
the chance to mature and the theory that offenses committed by adolescents are less
blameworthy than those committed by adults because the offender is not fully ma-
ture." ZImRiNG, supra note 36, at 79. Implicit in Zimring's statement is an assumption
that delinquent conduct may desist with maturity because it is driven by developmen-
tal forces.
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Although the influence of developmental factors on crimi-
nal conduct was mostly presumed rather than analyzed, several
characteristics of adolescents were understood by post-Gault re-
formers both to contribute to criminal conduct and to render
adolescents less blameworthy. As compared to adults, minors
were assumed to be more impulsive, to have less capacity for self
control, to lack experience, and to be more inclined to focus on
immediate rather than long-term consequences of their
choices. Observers also pointed to the importance of peer ap-
proval (and peer pressure), rebellion against parental authority
and restrictions, and the inclination of adolescents to experi-
ment and engage in risk-taking as developmentally-linked fac-
tors contributing to youth crime. In combination, these traits
were taken to characterize adolescence itself, and therefore to
justify a conclusion that adolescent criminal conduct generally
was less culpable than that of adults."
These reform initiatives contributed to enormous changes
in legal policy toward juveniles charged with crime. In the post-
Gault generation, many legislatures have enacted retributive and
more determinate sentencing provisions, in which the purpose
of public protection is explicit and the seriousness of the pres-
ent offense and the juvenile's prior record have become central
factors." Nevertheless, the statutory revisions until recently
4 2 The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force recognized that
adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable,
more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by
youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but
they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to con-
trol their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults.... It is unrealis-
tic to view a sixteen-year-old as completely devoid ofjudgment and control; it is
equally unrealistic to treat young offenders as if they have fully mature judgment
and control.
See id. at 7.
'3 Id. at 3.
414 Zimring claims that a sound sentencing policy should take into account the
forces that impinge on adolescent life, including the adolescent's shaky judg-
ment and incapacity to resist peer pressure. The concept of diminished respon-
sibility means that young offenders should be treated more leniently than adult
offenders not because their acts are less dangerous but because they are less ca-
pable of controlling impulses, resisting peers, or thinking in the long-range
terms that characterize mature decision-making.
Id. at 80.
"' In 1977, the State of Washington enacted a comprehensive juvenile sentencing
scheme, based on retributive and deterrent principles. Sentencing considerations in-
1997]
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generally reflected the reformers' core prescription limiting ret-
ribution-that most juveniles, because of developmental imma-
turity, should be subject to less punishment than adult
criminals.
C. MODERN REFORMS-OBSCURING THE DEVELOPMENTAL LINES
The constraint on retribution that weighed so heavily with
the post-Gault reformers has become considerably less impor-
tant in recent years. The emphasis today is on social control-
on protecting society from the harms inflicted by young offend-
ers-and the clear trend has been toward imposing penalties on
adolescents (especially those who commit violent crimes) that
approximate sanctions imposed on adults. 6 These policies ex-
plicitly or implicitly present adolescent offenders as indistin-
guishable from adults, and reject the importance of youthful
immaturity in the legal response to youth crime. As one advo-
cate of "get tough" policies put it, juvenile offenders "are crimi-
nals who happen to be young, not children who happen to be
criminal.
47
Some supporters of this trend challenge the notion that
tough young criminals are less culpable or less mature than
their adult counterparts, and argue that the juvenile justice sys-
tem coddles young criminals. On this view, the traditional ac-
clude age, seriousness of present offense, criminal record. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.010(2) (West 1993). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A-4A-43(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1997) (offense, criminal record, aggravating and
mitigating circumstances); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151-355 (Banks-Baldwin 1993 &
Supp. 1997) (mandatory minimum sentences for serious crimes.); Tax. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 54.04 (West 1996) (determinate sentences for serious felonies). See generally
Feld, supra note 25, at 709-10. The amended statutes usually continue to describe the
rehabilitative goal, but also emphasize the importance of protecting public safety and
of punishing the juvenile offender. See, e.g., CAL. WELE. & INST=. CODE § 202(a)
(West 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996).
" In 1992, for example, Massachusetts enacted a minimum sentence of 20 years for
a murder delinquency adjudication. The statute provided for convicted youths to be
moved at age 21 from the juvenile to the criminal correction system. MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 72 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). See also discussion in Thomas
Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective, 20
LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 229, 231 (1996), and in Feld, supra note 25, at 709-13. Poten-
tially far-reaching punitive federal legislation is discussed infra note 50.
1 Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away With Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs
An Overhaul 34 POL'Y REv. 65 (1985). See also Laura Stepp, The Crackdown on Juvenile
Crime: Do Stricter Laws Deter Youth ?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at Al (quoting a Mary-
land legislator to have said that, "[i] f they want to do adult-type crimes, we're going to
treat them like adults").
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count of immature youngsters getting into scrapes with the law
simply does not describe the savvy young offenders committing
serious crimes today.48 Minors who inflict serious harm are
deemed to be engaging in adult-like criminal conduct, and thus
are presumed to be sufficiently mature to be tried and punished
as adults. According to one critic, "[s] ociety may wish to be le-
nient with first offenders, particularly for lesser crimes, but there
is no reason that society should be more lenient with a sixteen year old of-
fender than a thirty year old offender. 49
Several legislative strategies have been employed to treat ju-
venile offenders more like their adult counterparts. Many stat-
utes provide for increasingly broad authority to adjudicate
juveniles charged with serious offenses in adult criminal court,
. Connecticut legislators advocating tough reforms that would allow most 14-year-
olds charged with violent crimes to be tried as adults, complained that the juvenile
justice system was geared more to the 1930s than to the 1990s. "Instead of youthful
mischief such as vandalism, crimes committed by teenagers today are as likely to be
shootings and stabbings." Matthew Daly, House Toughens Juvenile Justice: Lawmakers
Back Bill to Ty Youths as Adults in Some Violent Crimes, HAI TFORD COURANT, June 4,
1995, at Al. See also Regnery, supra note 47, at 65; Mark Dowie, Tough Justice, When
Kids Commit Adult Crime, Some Say They Should Do Adult Time, 13 CAL. LAW. 54 (1993).
Regnery challenges the naivete of a system in which he concluded, kids were literally
"getting away with murder." Juveniles commit nearly one-third of the serious crimes
in America, with 16-year-old boys committing crimes at a higher rate then any other
single age group. Regnery, supra, at 65.
' Regnery, supra note 47, at 68 (emphasis added). Regnery, the administrator of
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention during the Reagan Ad-
ministration, argued that the current theories and policies that are used to deal with
juvenile crime "fail to hold offenders accountable and do not deter crime. At best
they are outdated; at worst, they are a total failure, and may even abet the crimes they
are supposed to prevent." Id. at 65. Regnery further explains that:
Criminals should be treated as criminals. It is true that environmental factors
may contribute to some juvenile crimes, but this is also true of adult crimes ...
Anyone familiar with the nature of juvenile crime will not make the argument
that juvenile crimes differ in their magnitude or brutality than adult crimes; in
many cases the reverse is true. So, the current approach, which makes a radical
distinction between criminals under 18 and those over 18, is often counterpro-
ductive.
Id. at 68.
Even in the 1970s, some critics of the traditional court vehemently argued for
treating juvenile criminals like adults. See ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS: CONCERNING AVERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 173-75 (1975) ("There is
little reason left for not holding juveniles responsible under the same laws that apply
to adults. The victim of a fifteen-year-old mugger is as much mugged as the victim of
a twenty-year-old mugger, the victim of a fourteen-year-old murderer or rapist is as
dead or raped as the victim of an older one. The need for social defense or protec-
tion is the same.").
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either through judicial transfer or through legislative waiver.0
The age of transfer has been lowered in many jurisdictions, and
a broader range of felonies can lead to adjudication as an
adult.5' Moreover, categories of youthful offenders increasingly
are statutorily defined as adults and excluded from juvenile
court jurisdiction based on offense and age (rather than traits of
the juvenile) . Currently, in many states, juveniles who have
barely reached adolescence can be tried as adults and incarcer-
ated in adult prisons.s Another response is to provide stiff
statutory minimum sentences in juvenile court for certain of-
fenses, often resulting in adult incarceration. 4 Some critics of
the juvenile justice system would push this trend to its logical
extreme and abolish separate juvenile courts altogether.
Criminal courts also appear to have adopted the view that
youth is not an important factor in distinguishing juveniles from
50 See Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial, 12 CraM. JusT. 4, 5-6 (1997)
(describing the shift in many states from discretionary judicial transfer to a "waive[r]
exclusion" which automatically places certain offences under the jurisdiction of the
adult criminal justice system even where a perpetrator is ajuvenile). Grisso notes that
fully 90% of all states have toughened theirjuvenile justice laws in recent years. Id. at
5. For an exhaustive listing and classification of current juvenile justice statutes, see
Ainsworth, supra note 25, at 1106-12; Eric Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in
the United States 1979-1995: A Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46 Juv. &
FAM. CT.J. 17, 29 (1995).
A bill currently before Congress, if enacted, would expand the impact of this
trend. S.10, 105th Cong. §206(b) (1997). The Violent and RepeatJuvenile Offender
Act provides that juveniles age 14 and above can be tried and punished as adults, at
the discretion of the United States Attorney in federal court. More importantly, the
bill includes a provision for incentive block grants (in the amount of $650,000,000
per year) to be awarded to states that establish similar procedures for youths charged
under state law with crimes of violence, offenses involving controlled substances, or
unlawful possession of a firearm.
-" See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-5 (1995) (providing for transfer at age 13).
Some states have no minimum age of transfer. See Grisso, supra note 50, at 6; Grisso,
supra note 46, at 231.
12 See Feld, supra note 16, at 489; Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 50, at 29-31.
" See statutes described in Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 50, at 32-33. Georgia
recently enacted a statute authorizing the adjudication of 12-year-old defendants as
adults. SeeGA. CODEANN. § 15-11-5 (1995).
s For a discussion of the Massachusetts statute, see supra note 46. New York has
several "designated felonies" which carry long sentences for juveniles. Governor Pa-
taki proposes to expand the list and to expand crimes for which children as young as
13 years can be tried as adults. James Dao, New York's Top Democrat Takes Tougher
Stance on Juvenile Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1996, at A5. A legislative Commission in
Virginia has recently recommended an extension to age 25 of dispositional jurisdic-
tion in the juvenile correctional system to deal with serious offenders. REPORT OF THE
VA COMM'N ON YOUTH, supra note 4, at 8.
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adults. Despite some predictions to the contrary, adult criminal
courts do not seem to respond to juvenile offenders more leni-
ently than to adult criminals.5 5 Studies have found that adoles-
cents charged with serious offenses are convicted at about the
same rate as adults and, if convicted, receive sentences of similar
severity.
56
This approach to juvenile criminal conduct seems to rest on
an assumption of adolescent competence, implicitly holding
that there are no psychological differences between adolescent
and adult offenders that are important to criminal responsibility
or to participation in an adult criminal proceeding. Usually the
issue is not addressed, and the argument for tough sanctions fo-
cuses on the harm caused by youthful predators.57 However,
those who would treat young offenders as adults appear to as-
sume that almost all juveniles meet any standard for maturity
that might be relevant.
Despite the seemingly inexorable quality of the trend to-
ward imposing full criminal responsibility on juvenile defen-
dants, the account of adolescence that is embedded in the
punitivist reforms has generated discomfort and controversy 8
" Barry Feld in his article in this symposium argues for a reduced sentencing
scheme for juvenile offenders in his proposed unified criminal court. Barry Feld,
Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J.
CRM. L. & CRuMNOLOGY 68 (1997). Evidence to date suggests that political pressures
make such a result unlikely. See studies cited in Grisso, supra note 46, at 242 (con-
cluding that the public does not consider defendant age as a strong mitigating factor
for serious offenses).
" See Grisso, supra note 46, at 231 (citing studies).
17 See Regnery, supra note 47, at 68; VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 49, at 173-75.
'Discomfort is even more acute when cases arise involving pre-adolescent offend-
ers committing serious violent crimes. The highly publicized case of Robert
("Yummy") Sandifer, an 11-year-old Chicago boy who killed another child (perhaps
to impress gang members) is a good example. SeeJohn McCormick, Death of a Child
Crimina NEWswEE, Sept. 12, 1994, at 45. Robert's history was a story of abuse, family
instability, and serious problem behavior from an early age. At the time of his death,
his rap sheet included 23 felonies. In the aftermath of the case (Robert himself was
killed a few days after his offense, probably by gang members fearing that he would
implicate them), many who were involved in the case expressed frustration about the
lack of secure treatment facilities to deal with cases like Robert's. Id. Few observers,
however, suggested that an effective "solution" to cases like this, or to the social prob-
lems that they reveal, is to impose adult criminal punishment on pre-teen offenders.
See, e.g., Editorial, Stopping Young Offenders, ATLANTAJ. & ATLANTA CONST., May 16,
1997, at A18 (arguing that punishing juvenile offenders as adults "is a formula for
creating juveniles who-after being abused or 'educated' in the adult system-
emerge more hardened and vicious than when they went in."); see also MARTIN
WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 252 (1972) (suggesting that
juvenile offenders punished as adults "commit more serious crimes [later in life] with
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Many observers continue to emphasize the importance of youth-
ful immaturity as an important limitation on criminal responsi-
bility. 9 Even some proponents of the abolition of the juvenile
court, such as Barry Feld, argue that minors are less capable of
sound judgment, because of impulsiveness and a reduced capac-
ity to appreciate the consequences of their acts, and thus are
less culpable than adult offenders. 6° Feld concludes that the
punished as adults "commit more serious crimes [later in life] with greater rapidity
than those who experience a less constraining contract with the judicial and correc-
tional systems.").
" Commentators challenge the assumptions about youth underlying recent policy,
and argue that characteristic developmental traits may be relevant to decisions to en-
gage in criminal conduct. See e.g., Grisso, supra note 50, at 9 (listing authorities that
studied and analyzed juvenile competency); Charles E. Springer, Rehabilitating theJu-
venile Court, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397, 420 (1991) (traits which jus-
tify "treating young law violators differently than old ones" include "the diminished
capacity of youth and their universally understood attributes-imperfect judgment,
immature attitudes, impulsivity, [and] the difficult-to-resist need to please their
peers"); Gardner, supra note 26, at 195-96 ("Developmental differences generally
render adolescent persons less culpable or criminally responsible than their adult
counterparts. Adolescent persons lack life experience and thus might be best viewed
as 'semi-autonomous,' 'incomplete adults.' It is therefore unrealistic and unfair to
hold them to adult responsibility standards."); Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Jus-
tice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 142-43 (1987);
Teitelbaum, supra note 27, at 389 ("[A] dolescence is often marked by identity confu-
sion and preoccupation with appearances in the eyes of others, and by a concern with
the present rather than with long-term implications of conduct. Adolescents often
are, in short, more vulnerable to peer pressure, more impulsive, and less thoughtful
of consequence than adults. Our awareness of these characteristics should make us
even less ready to rely on the categorical inferences of culpability that the criminal
law incorporates.") (citations omitted); Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: To-
ward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REv. 146, 158 (1989) ("It is unfair to hold adoles-
cents accountable for their behavior at the same level that we hold adults. When the
state has systematically denied adolescents experience in decision-making, it is unrea-
sonable for society to expect the same quality of decision-making from adolescents
that it expects from adults."); Forst & Blomquist, supra note 17, at 371-72 (comparing
juvenile dispositions to the regulations imposed for drinking alcohol, driving, and
marriage because both "seek to protect young people from the full consequences of
judgments that reflect their current state of immaturity and inexperience."); Id. at
327 (Adolescents "have yet to obtain the full complement ofjudgment and maturity
the legal system attributes to individuals who have reached the age of majority and
who are to be held fully blameworthy for their acts of wrongdoing.... [This] implies
that youths should continue to be treated differently from adults, even when by ap-
pearance and behavior, they may seem adult-like.").
60 Feld and other critics argue that the juvenile court does not accord youthful de-
fendants the most basic legal safeguards and that it employs unjust procedures which
often treat similarly situated juveniles differently. These proponents argue that juve-
niles subject to adult criminal proceedings will benefit from the array of procedural
protections that are afforded to adult criminal defendants. See Feld, supra note 25, at
722-25; Ainsworth, supra note 25; Katherine H. Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile
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immaturity of juvenile offenders can be accommodated at sen-
tencing.61 Thus, the intuitions about the immaturity of youth
that drove the early Progressive founders of the court and the
post-Gault reformers continue to be expressed today. Currently,
however, these concerns tend to be overwhelmed in the debate
by accounts of the social costs of a system that fails to restrain
young offenders whose age alone distinguishes them from adult
criminals.
II. YOUTHFUL OFFENDING IN A DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORK
Developmental psychology offers a useful perspective from
which to examine and evaluate the changing conceptions of
adolescence that have been reflected in the legal responses to
juvenile crime during this century. It also clarifies the role that
delinquent behavior may play in adolescence. In this Part, we
clarify that many youths engage in criminal activity during ado-
lescence but do not persist into adulthood-a phenomenon
that can be explained most satisfactorily in developmental and
social terms.61 We then narrow the focus to examine develop-
mental influences on decision-making that may distinguish the
choices of adolescents from those of adults. Our interest here is
in factors that may affect the understanding, reasoning and-
perhaps most importantly-the judgment of youths who engage
Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CoNTEh. L. 23
(1990).
6, See, e.g., Feld, supra note 25, at 723-34:
Without a juvenile court, an adult criminal court that administers justice for
young offenders could provide children with all the procedural guarantees al-
ready available to adult defendants and additional enhanced protections because
of the children's vulnerability and immaturity.... The only virtue of the con-
temporary juvenile court is that juveniles convicted of serious crimes receive
shorter sentences than do adults. Youthfulness, however, has long been recog-
nized as a mitigating, even if not an excusing, condition at sentencing. The
common law's infancy defense presumed that children below age fourteen
lacked criminal capacity, emphasized their lack of fault, and made youthful irre-
sponsibility explict Youths older than fourteen are mature enough to be re-
sponsible for their behavior, but immature enough as to not deserve punishment
commensurate with adults.
See also Ainsworth, supra note 25, at 1130-31 ("[T]he ordinary criminal justice system
could and undoubtedly would adapt to the extension of their jurisdiction over mi-
nors" and adult sentences would not "necessarily ignore the fact of youth as a mitigat-
ing factor."); Melton, supra note 59, at 152 ("[T]he absence of ajuvenile court does
not eliminate the possibility of fully or partially exculpating juveniles on the basis of
their immaturity.").
62 We explore this phenomenon and sketch a theoretical account developed by
Terrie Moffitt linking adolescent antisocial behavior to societal constrains on the as-
sumption of adult roles. See Moffitt, supra note 9.
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in criminal conduct. Finally, we explore how these develop-
mental influences may affect choices made in the criminal jus-
tice context-both choices associated with criminal conduct and
choices made by youthful defendants in the criminal process.
A- ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS A PART OF ADOLESCENCE
Substantial evidence indicates that many adolescents be-
come involved in criminal activity in their teens and desist by
the time they reach young adulthood. Beginning in early ado-
lescence, criminal behavior increases through age sixteen and
declines sharply from age seventeen onward.63 Self-report stud-
ies indicate that most teenage males engage in some criminal
conduct, leading criminologists to conclude that participation
in delinquency is "a normal part of teen life."'' For most adoles-
cent delinquents, desistance from antisocial behavior also seems
to be a predictable component of the maturation process.6
Only a small group of young offenders will persist in a life of
crime.6
A representative sample of adolescents involved in criminal
activity will include a large group whose antisocial conduct is
Richard Jessor & Shirley L. Jessor, PROBLEM BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOSOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF YOUTH (1977); David P. Farrington, Offend-
ing from 10 to 25 Years of Age, in PROSPECTIVE STUDIES IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (K.
Teilman Van Deusen & SA. Mednick eds., 1983); Moffitt, supra note 9, at 675 fig.1.
6 See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 675; Delbert Elliott, Serious Violent Offenders: Onset, De-
velopmental Course, and Termination, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (1994) (The Am. Soc'y of
Criminology 1993 Presidential Address). Official crime rates, of course, are much
lower, since self-reports include much undetected crime.
' See Edward Mulvey & John La Rosa, Delinquency Cessation and Adolescent Develop-
ment, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 212 (1986); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson,
Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc. 552 (1983); see also Moffitt, supra note
9, at 675; Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal Careers, 237
Sci. 985 (1987); David Farrington, Age and Crime, in 7 CRIME ANDJUSTICe: AN ANNUAL
REVIEW OF RESEARCH, 189 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986). It is worth
noting that the studies deal with male offenders. Thus, the statements in the text
only describe male behavior.
' Marvin Wolfgang's famous study found that 6% of the juvenile population com-
mitted over 2/3 of all serious juvenile crime and over half of all juvenile offenses.
WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 58, at 89 tbl.6.2. According to this study, there was a
probability of 80% that boys arrested more than five times would continue to be ar-
rested numerous times, well into their adult years. Id. at 163. Wolfgang's results
were replicated in subsequent studies. See, e.g., PAUL TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY
CAREERS IN Two BIRTH COHORTS 90 (1990). Another study, looking at a broader
range of offenders, found that 2/3 of all violent crimes were committed by just 7% of
criminals. Mortimer Zuckerman, War on Crime, By the Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.,Jan. 17, 1994, at 68-69. See also Regnery, supra note 47, at 67.
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"adolescence-limited" and a much smaller group whose conduct
is "life-course-persistent."67 Although some youths in the latter
group initiate antisocial behavior in adolescence, many display a
variety of problem behaviors, beginning early in life and persist-
ing through adolescence into adulthood.6e Of those whose ado-
lescent delinquent conduct is a continuation of earlier
antisocial behavior, many, although certainly not all, will be-
come career criminals. However, as Moffitt points out, most
youths who engage in delinquent conduct have little notable
history of antisocial conduct in childhood; nor will the conduct
continue into adulthood.' 9 Involvement in criminal activity and
other antisocial behavior begins in adolescence and tends to fol-
low a "natural onset and recovery process. ''7
The developmental forces that contribute to the onset and
desistance of delinquent adolescent behavior are not well un-
derstood. Moffitt offers a plausible etiological theory under
which the tendency of adolescents to engage in antisocial behav-
ior can be understood as linked to the gap experienced by con-
temporary youth between early biological maturity and late
67 See Moffitt, supra note 9. Mulvey and Aber support this view, describing adoles-
cent delinquents as "a mix of 'novices, amateurs and persisters."' Edward Mulvey &
Mark Aber, "Growing Out" of Delinquency: Development and Desistance, in THE
ABANDONMENT OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIoR: PROMOTING THE TURNAROUND 99, 100
(Richard L. Jenkins & Waln K. Brown eds., 1988). Nagin and Land describe a more
complex taxonomy. See Nagin & Land, supra note 11.
' Marvin Wolfgang's study supports this taxonomy. WOLFGANG ET AI., supra note
58, at 130-40; Martin Wolfgang et al., Juvenile and Adult Criminal Careers, in FROM BOY
TO MAN, FROM DELaNQUENy TO CRuE 196 (1987) (follow-up study on the original
birth cohort project tracking the subjects' criminal careers into adulthood and find-
ingjuvenile delinquency to be the strongest predictor of adult criminality). Delbert
Elliott's self report study links early age of first offense with adult criminal conduct.
See Elliott, supra note 64, at 14. A self-report study by Delbert Elliott reports that for
youths whose first arrest is before age 12, 5 in 10 go on to adult criminal careers. For
those whose first arrest is between ages 12 and 14, 3 in 10 persist in crime as adults,
and for those whose first offense is after 14, only 1 in 10 go on to adult criminal con-
duct. Delbert Elliott et al., Self-Reported Violent Offending, 1 J. OF INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENcE 472 (1986).
Although Moffitt and others have divided adolescent offenders into the two cate-
gories described in the text, others have suggested that this is an oversimplification.
Particularly, the taxonomy omits adolescents that initiate antisocial behavior in ado-
lescence and persist into adulthood. See supra discussion in note 11.
61 See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 685.
70 Mulvey & Aber, supra note 67, at 100-02 (arguing that research should focus on
the developmental mechanisms associated with cessation of delinquency).
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social maturity and independence. 1 Moffitt argues that adoles-
cents are striving for elusive autonomy from parental and adult
authority in a context in which most privileges of adult status
are withheld. Many adolescents may be inclined to mimic their
antisocial peers, who appear to have attained adult status in72
many ways. Through antisocial conduct, the adolescent at-
tenuates the ties of childhood and demonstrates that he can act
independently. Under Moffit's theory, youthful antisocial risk-
taking acts are personal statements of independence by indi-
viduals who are precluded from yet assuming legitimate adult
roles.73 Desistance in young adulthood is explained under the
theory as the adaptive response to changed contingencies, as
more legitimate adult roles become available. Delinquent be-
havior becomes costly rather than rewarding, as many young
adults perceive that it threatens now-available conventional op-
portunities and may foreclose future goals. In short, they come
to realize that they have something to lose.74
B. REASONING AND JUDGMENT IN ADOLESCENT DECISION-MAKING
In this Part, we shift the focus from a general explanatory
account of youthful involvement in crime to an examination of
particular developmental influences on individual decision-
making that may shape the choices of youthful actors in ways
that distinguish them from adults. 7 Most familiar, and of par-
71 Moffitt, supra note 9, at 686-87. The maturity gap is not a modem phenomenon,
but the period of youthful dependency is longer in contemporary society than in ear-
lier periods. See KErr, supra note 19, at 114-16, 243.
72 For example, Moffitt argues that life-course persistent boys, already engaging in
a deviant lifestyle, are sexually active at an earlier age, less subject to parental and
adult authority, are able to attain possessions through theft, and generally seem to
"go their own way, making their own rules." Moffitt, supra note 9, at 687.
7
- 1d. at 688-89.
74 Id. at 690. Moffitt distinguishes adolescent-limited delinquents entering adult-
hood from life-course-persistent youths on a number of grounds that account for the
failure of youths in the latter group to desist in their antisocial behavior when they
become adults. Adolescents for whom delinquency is limited to this developmental
stage will not bear the cumulative effects of lifelong antisocial conduct. Typically,
they will have engaged in delinquent activity for a shorter time and of a less serious
nature than will their life persistent counterparts, and thus may be less likely to have
experienced damaging consequences. They are also more likely to have acquired so-
cial and academic skills that prepare them for adult roles. Finally, their delinquency
does not reflect deeply entrenched personality disorder as may often be true of life-
course-persistent offenders. Id. at 690-91.
7" For reviews of research comparing the reasoning and decision-making capacities
of adolescents and adults, see Leon Mann et al., Adolescent Decision-making: The Devel-
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ticular importance in assessing the competence of younger ado-
lescents to participate in criminal proceedings, are elements of
cognitive development-reasoning and understanding. More
salient to decisions about participation in criminal conduct are
psychosocial factors such as peer influence, temporal perspec-
tive (a tendency to focus on short-term versus long-term conse-
quences), and risk perception and preference. These
psychosocial factors may affect decision-making in powerful
ways that may distinguish juveniles from adults. We designate
these psychosocial influences as 'judgment" factors, and argue
that immature judgment in adolescence may contribute to
choices about involvement in crime.76 This framework is largely
consistent with Moffitt's theory, but focuses on internal dynamic
influences on adolescent decision-making that are associated
with this developmental stage, whereas Moffitt's emphasis is on
changing external contingencies.
1. Cognitive Capacity: The Process ofDecision-making
It is generally recognized that decision-making capacities
increase through childhood into adolescence and that, al-
though there is great variability among individuals, preadoles-
cents and younger teens differ substantially from adults in their
abilities. Development occurs along several lines. The capaci-
ties to process information and to think hypothetically develop
into adolescence, and cognitive performance improves gener-
ally due to knowledge gained in specific domains. Moreover,
opment of Competence, 12 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 265 (1989); LrrA FuRBY & RUTH BEnrH-
MAROM, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, RISK TAXING IN ADOLESCENCE: A
DECISION-MAKING PERSPECTIVE (1990).7
6 The judgment framework that we describe was developed and applied to adoles-
cent decision-making by Elizabeth Scott, N.D. Reppucci and Jennifer Woolard in ear-
lier work. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision-making in Legal
Contexts, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 221 (1995); Elizaibeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning
in Adolescent Decision-making, 37 VAL. L. REv. 1607 (1992). The impact of psychosocial
factors on adolescent decision-making was further developed by Lawrence Steinberg
and Elizabeth Cauffman. See Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of
Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision-making 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 249 (1996). For further discussion of the Steinberg and Cauffman approach,
see infra note 92. See also Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment: Psychosocial
Factors in Adolescent Decision-making (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Temple University) (on file with authors) (study finding differences in influence of
psychosocial factors on decision-making between adolescents and adults).
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cognitive skills acquired earlier mature and develop into adoles-
77
cence.
The question of how adolescents' capacities for understand-
ing and reasoning in making decisions compare with that of
adults has received much attention among policy analysts and
children's rights advocates in recent years-although largely not
in the context of juvenile justice policy. Proponents of broader
self-determination rights for minors, drawing on child develop-
ment theory and empirical research, have argued that, by about
age fourteen, adolescents' cognitive decision-making abilities
are similar to those of adults.7 8 This argument holds that ado-
lescents are capable of making informed and competent deci-
Developmental theorists have posited that cognitive development progresses
throughout childhood until mid-adolescence. See infra note 80 (discussing Piaget).
Although Piaget's stage theory is questioned by modern cognitive psychologists, see
infra note 85, it is generally accepted that developmental change in cognitive devel-
opment occurs through the early teen years.
Flavell and his colleagues provide an excellent account of developments from
middle childhood to adolescence in their text on cognitive development. SeeJOHN
FLAVELL ET AL., COGNDTIVE DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1993). They emphasize the follow-
ing areas of development, some of which are mentioned in the text: Adolescents are
more likely to approach a decision/problem by focusing on the possible and to think
hypothetically, whereas elementary school children focus on the real and think con-
cretely. Id. at 139-40. Adolescents have more knowledge in various specific knowl-
edge domains, which is linked to better cognitive performance in these domains. Id.
at 142-46. Information processing capacity increases with age. Id. at 146-49. Adoles-
cents have more advanced metacognition (cognition about cognition). Id. at 149-54.
They have a more developed "sense of the game" (what it means to think well versus
poorly). Finally, the cognitive capacities that emerge in childhood improve with de-
velopment over time. Id. at 156-59.
Some research about medical decision-making supports the conclusion that
younger children and young adolescents are likely to engage in a simpler decision-
making process than mid-adolescents and adults. See, e.g., Bruce Ambuel & Julian
Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents'Psychological and Legal Competence to Con-
sent to Abortion, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B.
Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Deci-
sions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982); Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Deci-
sions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CIL DEV. 538
(1981).
7' See, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy
as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983); Patricia King, Treatment and
Minors: Issues Not Involving Lifesaving Treatment, 23 J. FAM. L. 241, 252-53 (1984-85);
Stephen B. Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 301,
306-08 (1986); Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n In Support of
Appellees, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-805) (arguing against
parental notification of adolescent abortion decision, in part on ground that adoles-
cents have similar decision-making competence); Brief for Amicus Curiae American
Psychological Ass'n In Support of Appellees, Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 484 U.S. 171 (1987)
(No. 85-673).
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sions about medical treatment and other matters, and should
have the legal authority to do so." The evidence for these
claims is drawn in part from Piaget's stage theory of cognitive
development and from several empirical studies of minors'
ability to understand and reason about medical and abortion
decisions, 1 to understand treatment issues in psychotherapy,82
and to understand their Fifth Amendment rights and the mean-
ing of Miranda waivers.3
Together, this scientific research and theory support the
claim that adolescents are more competent decision-makers
than has been presumed under paternalistic policies, but the
scientific evidence for the claim that their cognitive decision-
making capacity is comparable to that of adults is unclear. We
and others have made this argument elsewhere,84 and thus we
will sketch only the most salient points. First, Piaget's strict
stage theory of cognitive development is no longer accepted
among cognitive psychologists. Further, the studies that sup-
port the claim of competence are small and mostly involve mid-
Informed consent doctrine requires that medical decisions be based on know-
ing, voluntary and intelligent (competent) consent. See Scott, supra note 76, at 1624.
" Under Piagetian theory, by about age 14, minors reach the stage of formal op-
erations, the stage of cognitive development in which the capacity for adult-like rea-
soning is attained. FLAVELL ET AL, supra note 77; BARBEL INHELDER &JEAN PIAGET, THE
GROWTH OF LOGICAL THMNNG FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (1952). Formal
operations includes the ability to think hypothetically, and to compare alternatives in
making decisions, a critical component of rational decision-making. A fuller discus-
sion of these the theory and research is included in Scott et al., supra note 76, at 224-
26.
', See studies cited supra note 78.
"Nancy Kaser-Boyd et al., Children's Understanding of Risks and Benefits of Psychother-
apy, 15 CLINICAL CHILD PsYcHOL- 165 (1986); Nancy Kaser-Boyd et al., Minors'Ability to
Identify Risks and Benefits of Therapy, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL. 411 (1985) [hereinafter Kaser-
boyd et al., Minors'Ability].
THOMAS GRmssO, JUVENIL' WAtVER OF MRANDA RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYcHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive
Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1134 (1980).
"' Scott, supra note 76; Grisso et al., supra note 25, at 15; Grisso, supra note 50, at 7-
9; Grisso, supra note 46, at 233-35. These critiques draw on the impressive analysis of
william Gardner and his colleagues. William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientfic Author-
ity: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895 (1989).
The key challenge is to the idea that cognitive development is stage-like, in the
sense that children at a given stage engage in characteristic reasoning across task do-
mains. Rather, skills seem to develop at different rates in different domains, and
competence to make one kind of decision cannot be generalized. ROBERT SIEGLER,
CHILDREN'S THINKING 49-57 (2d ed. 1991); FIAVELLETAL., supra note 77, at 114.
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dle class subjects of average intelligence. 6 Only a handful com-
pare the decision-making of minors with that of adults. Finally,
the studies of adolescent decision-making have been conducted
in laboratory settings in which the decision is hypothetical and
"pre-framed" in the sense that all relevant information is pro-
vided to the subjects.s This format yields little useful data about
how decisions are made in informal unstructured settings (such
as the street), in which decision-makers must rely on their own
experience and knowledge in making choices. Moreover, re-
search offers little evidence of how minors may function relative
to adults in stressful situations in which decisions have salience
to their lives.89
In sum, scientific authority indicates that, in general, the
cognitive capacity for reasoning and understanding of preado-
lescents and many younger teens differs substantially in some
regards from that of older teens and adults. Tentative authority
also supports the conclusion that, by mid-adolescence, youthful
capacities for reasoning and understanding approximate those
of adults. Whether and how these capacities are employed,
however, may be quite variable, and adolescent performance is
not necessarily like that of adults in various contexts. Because
the research was largely undertaken in structured settings, the
findings may be more useful in shedding light on questions
about competence to stand trial than on cognitive capacity as it
affects choices relevant to criminal conduct.90
2. Judgment Factors in Decision-making
Psychosocial developmental factors may also influence deci-
sion-making by adolescents in ways that are relevant to compe-
tence to stand trial and criminal responsibility. Particularly
salient in this context might be factors such as (1) conformity
86See Grisso, supra note 46, at 233. Thus differences in understanding and reason-
ing can be found between delinquent adolescents and adults with lower IQ and lower
socio-economic background, but not when both groups are of average intelligence.
Id.
87 See supra note 75.
See discussion of studies in Scott, supra note 76, at 1631-36.
89 Steinberg and Cauffman suggest that stress and moodiness may be factors in
adolescent decision-making. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 76, at 261-62.
90 Choices about participation in the proceedings are made in a structured setting
in which information can be provided, whereas on the street, the youth must rely on
his own knowledge and experience.
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and compliance in relation to peers, (2) attitude toward and
perception of risk, and (3) temporal perspective. If these fac-
tors influence decision-making, the impact is not on cognitive
competence, narrowly defined,91 but rather on 'judgment" (as
the term is used in common parlance) .92 The traditional pre-
sumption (in juvenile justice and in many other policy areas)
that minors are not fully accountable and need legal protection
rests in part on a view that their judgment is immature. In es-
sence, the intuition is that developmentally-linked predisposi-
tions and responses systematically affect decision-making of
adolescents in ways that may incline them to make choices that
threaten harm to themselves and to others. Whereas cognitive
competence affects the process of decision-making, immature
judgment is reflected in outcomes, in that developmental fac-
tors influence values and preferences, which in turn shape the
cost-benefit calculus. The influence of these factors (peer influ-
ence, attitude toward risk, and temporal perspective) will
change as the individual matures and values and preferences
change-resulting in different choices.
" Under informed consent standards, which have formed the framework in which
competence is analyzed, only cognitive capacities of reasoning and understanding are
implicated. See Scott, supra note 76, at 1625.
2The judgment framework that follows was developed by Scott, Reppucci and
Woolard. See Scott et al., supra note 76, at 226-35. Other researchers who have exam-
ined these issues are Larry Steinberg and Elizabeth Cauffman. See Steinberg &
Cauffman, supra note 76, at 250. Based on an examination of the developmental re-
search and theory, Steinberg and Cauffman have developed a more complex frame-
work which conceptualizes three decision-making domains that affect judgment:
responsibility; temperance; and perspective. Id. at 252. Responsibility involves the
development of autonomy and independence (an important factor of which is declin-
ing susceptibility to peer influence), growth of coherent identity, and ego develop-
ment. Id. at 253-58. The second domain, temperance, involves impulsiveness and the
inclination to engage in risky activities. Id. at 258-59. Within this domain, a tendency
toward sensation-seeking, physiological changes of adolescence and emotional volatil-
ity are offered to explain adolescents' greater tendency to take risks. Id. at 259-62.
The third domain, perspective, involves the ability to temporal perspective and the
ability to see how one's actions affect others and the ability to compare alternative
consequences. Id. at 262-63. All of these dimensions of perspective involve "decen-
tration," the ability to shift from more obvious (central) considerations, to more sub-
tle or remote ones. Id. at 263.
This description suggests that the three judgment factors in our decision-making
framework are each core factors in the three domains in the more complex Steinberg
and Cauffman framework. In an empirical study comparing psychosocial influences
on adolescents and adults decision-making in these three domains, Cauffman found
differences in maturity ofjudgment between adolescents and adults based on differ-
ences in psychosocial development. Cauffman, supra note 76.
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a. Peer Influence
It is widely assumed that peer influence plays an important
role in adolescent crime,9- and evidence supports the claim that
teens are more subject to this influence than are adults.94 Peer
influence seems to operate through two means: social compari-
son and conformity. Through social comparison, adolescents
measure their own behavior by comparing it to others.9 Social
conformity to peers, which peaks at about age fourteen, influ-
ences adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes to that
of their peers. 96 Peer influence could affect adolescent decision-
making in several ways. In some contexts, adolescents might
make choices in response to direct peer pressure. More indi-
rectly, adolescent desire for peer approval could affect the
choices made, without any direct coercion.97 Finally, as Moffitt
suggests, peers may provide models for behavior that adoles-
cents believe will assist them to accomplish their own ends.9
b. Attitude Toward Risk
Gang activity is largely an adolescent phenomenon, and generally adolescents
are more likely to commit crimes with peers than are adults. Much adolescent of-
fending is not formal gang activity, but rather small informal groups of two or three
youths. Solo offending becomes dominant by the mid-twenties. SeeAlbert Reiss, Jr. &
David Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About Co-offending: Results from a Prospective Lon-
gitudinal Survey of London Males, 82J. CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 360 (1991) (describing
the pervasive importance of peer influence on adolescent crime).
Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vcissitudes of Autonomy in Early
Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841 (1986). Although the trend of peer influence through
childhood and adolescence has been studied, little research has simultaneously stud-
ied peer influence on adolescents and adults. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note
76, at 254.
" N. SPRINTHALL & W.A. COLUNS, ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY: A DEVELOPMENTAL
VIEw (1988).
9J.S. COLEMAN, THE ADOLESCENT SoCIETY (1961); ThomasJ. Berndt, Developmental
Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 608, 611 (1979)
(finding that social conformity peaks in 9th grade for situations involving anti-social
behavior); Philip R Costanzo & Marvin E. Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age Leve
37 CHILD DEv. 967 (1966).
For example, an adolescent might engage in a particular conduct only because
she believes that peers will approve.
' See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Research evidence also indicates that adolescents differ
from adults in their attitude toward and perception of risk. It
is well established that adolescents and young adults generally
take more risks with health and safety than do older adults by
engaging more frequently in behavior such as unprotected sex,
drunk driving and criminal conduct.'0 This inclination may re-
sult because adolescents are less aware of risks than are adults,10
because they calculate the probability of risks differently, or be-
cause they value them differently.'0 2 In some contexts, adoles-
cent risk preferences may be linked to other developmental
factors. For example, adolescents may be more averse than
adults to risking social ostracism.
c. Temporal Perspective
"See, e.g., William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in
ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 78-79 (NancyJ. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); William
Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective,
in ADoLEscCNTs IN THE AIDS EPmEMc 24 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990); Peter
Finn & Barry W.E. Bragg, Perception of the Risk of an Accident by Young and OlderDrivers,
18 ACcIDENTANALYSIS PREVENTION 289, 296 (1986); Michael L. Matthews & Andrew R.
Moran, Age Differences in Male Drivers' Perception of Accident Risk: The Role of Perceived
Driving Ability, 18 ACCIDENT ANALy'SS & PREVENTION 299, 309-11 (1986); M. Tester et
al., Experimental Studies of the Development of Decision-making Competence, in CHILDREN,
RisS, AND DECISIONS: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL IMPICATIONS (Symposium materials,
Annual Convention of the Am. Psychological Ass'n, New York, Aug. 1987).
"o Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-making Per-
spectiv 12 DEv. REV. 1, 11-18 (1992).
101 Lewis, supra note 77, at 541-42 (reporting study that found that younger adoles-
cents thought of fewer risks of plastic surgery than did older adolescents and adults).
The belief that adolescents do not perceive risks accurately is supported by Elkind's
work, suggesting that adolescents perceive themselves as invulnerable from harm.
David Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1967). Other research-
ers have challenged the invulnerability hypothesis. Quadrel, Fischoff and Davis, for
example, found that adolescents did not perceive themselves to be more invulnerable
to certain risks (pregnancy, for example) than did their parents. Marilyn Jacobs
Quadrel et al., Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102, 106-07, 111-12
(1993). However, since the study did not provide data about the accuracy of each
group's perception of its own vulnerability to the particular risk, it sheds little light on
whether teens' perceptions are distorted. Thus, teens and their mothers may have
similar perceptions about their own vulnerability to the risk of unwanted pregnancy
(i.e., both groups may think they are at little risk), but teens may in fact be far more
vulnerable.
10 Compared to adults, adolescents tend to focus less on protection against losses
and more on opportunities for gains in making choices. See Gardner & Herman, su-
pra note 99, at 26-27; see also Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 100, at 7. An example
of how adolescents may value risks differently, though they calculate the same likeli-
hood as adults, might be the youth who thinks, "I know I'm likely to get killed, but I'd
rather take the risk than be rejected by my friends."
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Differences between adults and adolescents in attitude to-
ward risk are related to differences in temporal perspective.
Adolescents seem to discount the future more than adults do,
and to weigh more heavily short-term consequences of deci-
sions-both risks and benefits-a response that in some circum-
stances can lead to risky behavior.03  This tendency may be
linked to the greater uncertainty that young people have about
their future, an uncertainty that makes short-term consequences
seem more salient.0 4 It may also reflect the difference in expe-
rience between teens and adults. It may simply be harder for an
adolescent than for an adult to contemplate the meaning of a
consequence that will have an impact ten or fifteen years into
the future.
In general, the fact that adolescents have less experience
than adults seems likely to affect decision-making in tangible
and intangible ways. Although the relative inexperience of ado-
lescents has not been contested as a general proposition, the
relevance of inexperience to decision-making and judgment is
uncertain.
C. THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS ON DECISION-
MAKING ABOUT OFFENDING
The research evidence on the impact of immaturity of rea-
soning and judgment on adolescent decision-making is sketchy,
and, thus, assertions about the effects must be very tentative. 5
With this caveat, it seems probable that developmental factors
associated with adolescence could affect decision-making in sev-
eral ways. First, adolescents may use information differently
from adults. They may consider different or fewer options in
thinking about their available choices or in identifying conse-
'oS See Gardner & Herman, supra note 99, at 25-26. As Gardner and Herman point
out, the strong tendency of adolescents to focus on immediate consequences can lead
to risky behavior, because only the immediate and not the long term negative conse-
quences of a choice are weighed in making choices. Id Thus, adolescents may be
more inclined to engage in risky sexual behavior without thinking about AIDS or
pregnancy. The high rate of suicides among adolescents may also relate to temporal
perspective.
104 m
"' Preliminary research by Cauffman supports the proposition that psychosocial
factors influence maturity of judgment in decision-making in ways that distinguish
adults and adolescents. See Cauffman, supra note 76. However, far more empirical
research support is needed to clarify the extent and scope of these influences.
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quences when comparing alternatives."' The extent and
sources of the differences in use of information are unclear. It
is plausible that dissimilar and more limited experience and
knowledge, as well as attitudes toward risk, temporal perspec-
tive, and peer influence, are all implicated. These differences
may be most evident in unstructured informal settings, where
information is not provided, and individuals must make choices
based on their own knowledge and experience.0 Thus, adoles-
cents on the street, who are making choices that lead to crimi-
nal conduct, may be less able than adults to consider alternative
options that could extricate them from a precarious situation.
Secondly, substantial theoretical arguments hold that while
older adolescents may have adult-like capacities for reasoning,
they may not deploy those capacities as uniformly across differ-
ent problem-solving situations as do adults,108 and they may do
so less dependably in ambiguous or stressful situations.1°9 Fi-
nally, adolescents, for developmental reasons, could differ from
adults in the subjective value that is assigned to perceived con-
sequences in the process of making choices.' Influenced by
the developmental factors that we have described, adolescents
may weigh costs and benefits differently (or view as a benefit
what adults would count as a cost).
These developmentally driven differences could be impor-
tant to choices about participation in crime. Consider the fol-
"6 Catherine Lewis's study of the extent to which youths, aged 11 to 18, recognize
risks of cosmetic surgery supports this statement, and indicates that the range of al-
ternatives considered in making choices increases through adolescence. See Lewis,
supra note 77, at 541-43.
107 It is for this reason that one of us has argued elsewhere that research on deci-
sion-making using an informed consent framework (in which all salient information
is provided to subjects) may not get at differences between adults and adolescents.
See Scott, supra note 76, at 1631-36.
. See generally FLAVELL ET AL., supra note 77; ROBERT S. SEIGLER, CHILDREN'S
THINKING (2d ed. 1991).
19 Leon Mann, Stress, Affect, and Risk-Taking, in RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 201, 212-13
(J. Frank Yates ed., 1992); IrvingJanis, Decision-making Under Stress, in HANDBOOK OF
STRESS: THEORETICAL AND CuNICAL ASPECTS 69 (Leo Goldberger & Shlomo Breznitz
eds.,1982); Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 76, at 262.
"o See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 100, at 6; Gardner & Herman, supra note
99, at 24-26; Pamela Porter Kulbok et al., Life Style and Patterns of Health and Social Be-
havior in High-Risk Adolescents, 11 ADVANCES IN NURSING SCI. 22 (1988).
. Alida C. Benthin et al., A Psychometric Study of Adolescent Risk Perception, 16 J.
ADOLESCENCE 153, 164-65 (1993); Sarah E. Hampson et al., Adolescent Alcohol-
Related Risk-Taking- Exploring Structural Relations Among Risk Perceptions, Per-
sonality, and Risk-Taking (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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lowing example. A youth hangs out with his buddies on the
street. Someone suggests holding up a nearby convenience
store. The boy's decision to go along with the plan may pro-
ceed in the following way. He has mixed feelings about the
proposal, but doesn't think of ways to extricate himself-al-
though perhaps a more mature person might develop a strategy.
The possibility that one of his friends has a gun and the conse-
quences of that may not occur to him. He goes along, mostly
because he fears rejection by his friends, a consequence that he
attaches to a decision not to participate-and that carries sub-
stantial negative weight. Also the excitement of the hold-up and
the possibility of getting some money are attractive. These
weigh more heavily in his decision than the cost of possible ap-
prehension by the police, or the long-term costs to his future
life of conviction of a serious crime.112
The example presents, in our view, a quite plausible ac-
count of the influence of the developmental factors that we
have described on the decisions of adolescents to engage in
criminal conduct."3 The choice, although it may reflect a lack
of knowledge and experience, may not be irrational, because
the youth is choosing the option that promotes subjective utility,
given his values. The decision does, however, implicate imma-
turity of judgment-at least from a societal perspective-be-
cause it causes harm to a victim, and threatens harm to the
youth himself.
If these influences on decision-making are developmental
and not simply reflective of individual idiosyncratic preferences
for risk-taking, they should abate with maturity. This prediction
is consistent with the pattern of desistance from delinquent
conduct in late adolescence or early adulthood that we have de-
scribed.1 14 In general, it is reasonable to argue that the devel-
opmental factors of peer influence, temporal perspective, and
"1 Travis Hirshi and Michael Gottfredson assert that criminal conduct is defined by
a lack of concern for long-term consequences, but challenge whether this tendency is
subject to developmental influence after childhood. Travis Hirshi & Michael
Gottfredson, Rethinking the Juvenile Justice System, 39 CRiME & DEuNQ. 262, 263 (1993).
Certainly, other evidence suggests that it is linked to developmental maturity. Stein-
berg & Cauffman, supra note-76, at 266; Scott et al., supra note 76, at 238-39.
"' The account is drawn from the research and theory about adolescence that we
have described. No research of which we are aware has directly studied adolescents'
decision-making in the context of crime.
14 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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risk perception and preference contribute to delinquent behav-
ior and that their declining influence contributes to desistance.
Although the factors contributing to desistance have not been
adequately studied, researchers have linked desistance in late
adolescence to a longer-term perspective and to changing pat-
terns of peer relationships."" As Moffitt postulates, young adults
may cease to commit crimes because they come to understand
that the decision to offend carries the risk of lost future oppor-
tunities.1 6 In other words, a cost-benefit calculus leads to a con-
clusion that choosing crime no longer maximizes subjective
utility.
What is not clear is whether the source of the change is ex-
ogenous or endogenous. Moffitt seems to suggest that the cal-
culus shifts because external contingencies change." A focus
on psychosocial influences that contribute to immaturity of
judgment suggests that desistance can be linked to developmen-
tal maturation. Based on the developmental research and the-
ory that we have described, we are inclined to believe that much
adolescent participation in crime is the result of interaction be-
tween developmental influences on decision-making and exter-
nal contingencies that affect individuals during this stage. Very
recent studies have begun to demonstrate the relationship be-
tween psychosocial developmental factors and the quality of
youths' choices compared to those of adults."8 Further research
is required, however, to determine the degree to which these
developmental factors directly affect the decisions of youths par-
ticipating in delinquent activity.
D. THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS ON DECISION-
MAKING IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
Increasingly, under the legislative reforms of recent years,
youths who are charged with crimes are tried as adults, or face
severe punishment for their offenses even if they are tried in ju-
venile court.119 In this context, it becomes relevant to ask
whether developmental factors are likely to influence the ca-
... See Mulvey & LaRosa, supra note 65, at 231, 218-20.
116 See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 690.
"Id. at 690-91.
"s See, e.g., Cauffman, supra note 76 (finding differences in influence of psychoso-
cial factors on decision-making of adolescents and adults).
"9 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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pacities of youthful defendants to participate in their defense.
The importance of this inquiry is clear in light of the constitu-
tional requirement that criminal defendants be competent to
participate in the proceedings against them.12 Historically,
questions of competence to stand trial have arisen in cases in-
volving mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants. As
younger defendants face adult criminal proceedings and pun-
ishment, cases involving trial incompetence due to immaturity
are likely to increase.
Richard Bonnie has described two broad types of abilities
associated with the defendants' legal competence to participate
in criminal proceedings.' The first is the capacity to assist
counsel. This involves the defendant's ability to understand and
appreciate the meaning of the legal procedure and her rights
within that process, and the ability to assist counsel in develop-
ing a defense. 22 The second concept is decisional competence,
referring to defendants' capacities for reasoning and judgment
needed to make decisions in the process, including decisions to
waive important rights.2  In these areas of ability, developmen-
tal immaturity may impede the capacity of juvenile defendants
to participate in criminal proceedings. As compared to the
scant empirical data about youthful decisions to offend, 2 4 sub-
stantial research has examined different dimensions of juve-
niles' capacities as they could affect their participation in trials.
A recent comprehensive review of research suggests that delin-
quent adolescents are at risk of being less competent partici-
12 Dusky v. United States established the constitutional test for determining whether
a defendant is competent to stand trial under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). The Dusky test requires that the de-
fendant be able to understand the charges against him and to assist his attorney in his
defense. Id.
121 Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical
Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. Sca. & L. 291, 294 (1992).
'22 For example, the defendant must be able to communicate and understand rele-
vant information. Id. at 297.
"s Id. at 298-99. Waiver of the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the
right to testify are examples. Perhaps the most important decision that most defen-
dants make involves whether to plead guilty under a plea agreement.
1' Research on decision-making in that unstructured "natural" context of course
encounters far greater obstacles.
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pants in their defense then are adults, and that this risk is espe-
cially great for youths under the age of fourteen.
ta
Studies on youths' understanding of matters related to tri-
als, such as the roles of participants and the trial process, have
found that youths under the age of fourteen typically are defi-
cient in their knowledge of the legal process and its basic pur-
126poses. In contrast, few differences in basic understanding of
trial-related matters have been observed between adolescents
fourteen to seventeen years of age and adults, when the popula-
tions studied were "average" adolescents. Similarly, a conven-
tional grasp of the nature of legal rights typically has developed
127by mid-adolescence. Moreover, fundamental abilities of sensa-
tion, perception, and memory ordinarily have matured by early
adolescence, suggesting that adolescents on average should be
as capable as adults of providing accurate information to their
attorneys from their experience.
Delinquent youths, however, are more likely than average to
have disabilities-for example, emotional disturbances, learning
and attention deficit disorders, or poorer intellectual capaci-
ties-that may contribute to delays in the development of ca-
pacities for understanding, communication, and the ability to
attend to the trial process as it unfolds. 8 Studies of delinquent
youths' understanding of the trial process and capacity to assist
counsel have found important deficiencies, often distinguishing
these juveniles from adults and from "average" adolescents.
Compared to adults, both delinquent and non-delinquent ado-
lescents who have lower intelligence test scores, problematic
educational histories, learning disabilities, and mental disorders
'2' Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, PSYCH., PUB.
POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 1998). The present discussion summarizes Grisso's more
detailed review of research on these questions.
16 E.g., GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PREPARING SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN FOR
TESTIMONY: CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS (1992); Judy Cashmore &
Kay Bussey, Children's Conceptions of the Witness Role, in CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE IN LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS 177, 179-80 (J.R. Spencer et al. eds., 1990); Amye Warren-Leubecker et
al., What Do Children Know About the Legal System and When Do They Know It? First Steps
Down a Less Traveled Path in Child Witness Research, in PERSPECrIVES ON CHILDREN'S
TESTIMONY 158, 176-81 (S. Ceci et al. eds., 1989).
" Gary B. Melton, Children's Concepts of Their Rights, 9 J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCH. 186,
189 (1980).
"a Grisso et al., supra note 25, at 10 ("In addition to mental retardation..., mental
illness and other disorders have been noted in almost all existing cases [involving juve-
nile offenders].") (emphasis in original).
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have shown poorer comprehension of basic information about
the legal process.'9 Other evidence has suggested that delin-
quent youths' experience with courts, attorneys, and law en-
forcement officers does not reliably compensate for these
tendencies toward poorer understanding of information related
to the trial process and rights.130
Defendants must also be able to make decisions in the trial
process, and thus, reasoning and judgment capacities are impli-
cated, as well as understanding. The direct evidence is sketchy
about how adolescents compare with adults in their capacities to
reason about important legal decisions and in their valuation of
the consequences of those decisions. As we have described, ca-
pacities associated with reasoning and problem solving are in a
formative stage in the primary school years.'3' One study, for
example, found that youths between ten and thirteen-years-of-
age were significantly less likely than older adolescents to think
"strategically" about pleading decisions, when hypothetical con-
ditions varied as to evidence of guilt and seriousness of accusa-
'2 For example, in one study of comprehension of Miranda rights, mean perform-
ance of low-IQ (70 or below) 15 to19-year-olds was poorer than that of average-IQ 10
to 12-year-olds. See Grisso, supra note 50, at 7-8; Grisso, supra note 83, at 1152-56; see
also Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delin-
quency Proceedings: Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U. OF
LouIsviLIJ. OFFAM. L. 629, 643-47 (1995); Richard Lawrence, The Role of Legal Coun-
sel in Juveniles' Understanding of Their Rights, 34Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 49, 53 (1983); Mich-
ele Peterson-Bidali & Rona Abramovitch, Children's Knowledge of the Legal System: Are
They Competent to Instruct Legal Counsel, 34 CAN. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1992); Bar-
bara Zaremba, Comprehension of Miranda Rights by 14-18 Year Old African-
American and Caucasian Males With and Without Learning Disabilities (1992) (un-
published Ph.D. Dissertation, College of William & Mary) (on file with author).
More delinquent youths than adults perceived rights as "conditional"-something
that one was "allowed to do"--rather than as entitlements. S. Wall & M. Furlong,
Comprehension of Miranda Rights by Urban Adolescents with Law-Related Education, 56
PSYcHoL. REP. 359 (1985); GRISSO, supra note 83; Lawrence, supra, at 53-56.
'S0 Grisso, supra note 83, at 1155 (number of prior arrests was not related to delin-
quent youths' performance on tests of understanding of Miranda rights); Cowden &
McKee, supra note 129, at 655; Lawrence, supra note 129, at 53-56 (understanding of
trial process and trial participants roles was not related to delinquent youths' degree
of past involvement with justice system). But see A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan C. Doug-
las, A Study ofJuvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 48 (1970) (delinquent youths
had a better grasp of Miranda rights on average than did non-delinquent youths).
Grisso pointed out that the degree of understanding of law-related information in-
creased with prior court experience only for white juveniles and only when the num-
ber of prior arrests was above the average juvenile rap sheet. Grisso et al., supra note
25, at 13.
"' See, e.g., FLAvELL ET AL., supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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tions." Research finding younger adolescents to be less capable
of imagining risky consequences during hypothetical problem
solving,13 3 and to consider a more constricted number and range
of consequences,134 also suggests that they may have difficulty
considering the merits of plea agreements and making other
decisions about their defense. As we have indicated, most stud-
ies have found few differences between older adolescents (ages
fifteen to seventeen) and adults in formal decision-making func-
tions. I Again, however, most of these studies have involved
non-delinquent youths, without documented disabilities, proc-
essing hypothetical rather than real decision problems (in non-
stressful settings), focused on medical treatment rather than
116
criminal or delinquency adjudication.
Beyond the formal ability to understand and process infor-
mation, youthful judgment may differ from that of adults in
ways that could affect the ability to assist counsel and to make
decisions. How defendants respond to attorneys' advice and
weigh the consequences of their choices in the trial process may
be affected by psychosocial factors such as peer and adult influ-
ence, temporal perspective, and risk preference and perception.
Such differences might influence youths' judgments about the
value of accepting plea bargains 13 7 and of waiving important
rights in the legal process. In one study, for example, delin-
quent youths, in considering the waiver of Miranda rights, fo-
cused more than adults on immediate consequences of waiver
(release from custody) rather than the impact of the decision
on later events in court.138 A more subtle issue is the effect of
psychosocial factors on the attorney-client relationship, particu-
"' Michele Peterson-Bidali & Rona Abramovitch, Grade Related Changes in Young
People's ReasoningAbout Plea Decisions, 17 LAW& HUM. BAV. 537, 544-45 (1993).
3 Kaser-Boyd et al., Minors'Ability, supra note 82, at 414, 416; Lewis, supra note 77,
at 541.
" Grisso, supra note 46, at 234 (describing recent findings on such phenomena
among delinquents as fatalism, inability to frame problems in a larger context and in-
adequate perception of alternatives).
" See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
For example, will risk preference and temporal perspective influence juveniles
to be more likely than adults to "take a chance" by going to trial in the hopes of ac-
quittal, rather than accepting a guilty plea and lighter sentence?
" GRiSso, supra note 83. This was significantly more likely for younger adolescents
than for older adolescents. Grisso, supra note 83, at 1155, 1157.
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larly on the inclination to trust the attorney and to value her ad-
vice, as compared, for example, to advice from peers.
In the trend toward treating more and younger juveniles
charged with crimes as adults, little attention has been paid to
whether youthful defendants can competently participate in the
process. Yet it is uncontroversial that competence is a critical
requirement for fair criminal proceedings. The research evi-
dence suggests that many youths may be less competent than
adults to assist counsel and make important decisions in their
defense.
III. THE DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORKAND CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT
A. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMMATURITY
It seems likely that developmental influences relating to
understanding and judgment affect adolescent choices to com-
mit crime in ways that distinguish most young offenders from
their adult counterparts. Although individual adult and juve-
nile offenders may vary, decision-making factors associated with
age that affect decision-making provide a basis for differentiat-
ing between the two categories of offenders. Moreover, the fact
that delinquent behavior desists for most adolescents as they
approach adulthood strongly suggests that criminal conduct, for
most youths, is associated with factors peculiar to adolescence.
Thus, evidence from developmental psychology challenges the
account of adolescence offered by. the modern punitive reform-
ers, who generally discount the idea that relevant differences ex-
ist between youthful and adult offenders. This evidence also
suggests that the Progressives' account of youth involved in
crime as childlike and blameless actors in need of treatment is
skewed. In our view, when analyzed in the framework of con-
ventional criminal excuse doctrine, the developmental evidence
supports a presumption of diminished responsibility for adoles-
cent offenders-but not a lack of responsibility.
Analysis of how the differences between youthful and adult
offenders should count in formulating a legal response to juve-
nile crime can usefully begin by looking to the accepted under-
pinnings of adult criminal responsibility. The criminal law
posits that the offender is a rational actor, autonomously choos-
ing "to do the bad thing" on the basis of personal values and
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preferences.8 9 The legitimacy of punishment is undermined if
criminal choices depart substantially from this autonomy
model."" If youthful choices to offend are based on diminished
ability to make decisions, or if the choices (or the values that
shape the choices) are strongly driven by transient developmen-
tal influences, then the presumption of free will and rational
choice is weakened. Psychology, in providing evidence that de-
velopmental psychosocial factors may shape decision-making
well into adolescence, lends support to the intuitive conclusion
that immature offenders are less culpable than their adult coun-
terparts.
It is important, however, not to overstate the practical im-
portance of whatever differences may exist between adolescents
and adults.' Although much rhetoric about free will and
blameworthy choice surrounds the issue, criminal responsibility
defenses are very narrowly drawn under established doctrinal
standards for evaluating the quality of criminal choice. Many
adult defendants whose choices reflect serious impairment, or
coercion, or other exogenous influences are nevertheless con-
victed and punished for their crimes. For example, although
mental disability and disorder are not uncommon among
criminals, the modem insanity defense is available only to de-
fendants with severe cognitive impairment that renders them
unable to understand or appreciate the nature and quality of
their wrongful conduct.' Poverty and parental failure to incul-
cate appropriate norms are likely to exert strong influence on
criminal choices, and are outside the offender's control, and yet
" The premise that the criminal is an autonomous decision-maker is integral to
both retributive and deterrent theories of punishment. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW 7-8, 13 (1997). See also Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Crimi-
nology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1268 (1976) (arguing that
holding actors responsible "treats all persons as autonomous and capable of that most
human capacity, the power to choose").
"' At some level this underlies all exculpatory defenses, including the insanity de-
fense. It also supported the common law infancy defense. See Walkover, supra note
23.
141 It should be clear from the previous discussion that currently we have no reli-
able direct empirical information about the extent or exact nature of the differences.
"John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 305-08 (D. Faigman et al. eds.,
1997).
"' See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 139, at 467-76. Only 0.25% of criminal defendants
successfully assert an insanity defense. See H. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFER
H/NCKLEr EVALUATING INSAN= YDEFENSE REFORM 50-53 (1993).
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are deemed irrelevant to adult culpability. In short, despite the
theoretical commitment to requirements of free will and ra-
tional choice, in practice, only a small group of offenders whose
choices are extremely compromised are fully excused from
criminal liability.
When analyzed in this doctrinal framework, developmental
differences affecting decision-making are likely to be substantial
enough to provide categorical excuse from responsibility only
for very young juveniles, who are qualitatively different from
adults in moral, cognitive, and social development. Certainly by
mid-adolescence, the differences between adolescent and adult
decision-making are more subtle than those that distinguish the
adult offenders whose crimes are excused under current law
from other adult offenders. A categorical presumption of ado-
lescent nonresponsibility, such as that which was endorsed by
the traditional juvenile justice system, is hard to defend on
grounds of immaturity alone.'44
On the other hand, the perspective on adolescent criminal
conduct offered by developmental psychology also challenges
the retributive arguments of modem advocates of punitive poli-
cies. A claim that juvenile offenders deserve equivalent pun-
ishment to that imposed on adults presumes that no substantial
differences exist that undermine the legitimacy of imposing
equal measures of retribution on the two groups.14 On this
point, the evidence disputes the conclusion that most delin-
quents are indistinguishable from adults in any way that is rele-
vant to culpability, and supports the creation of two distinct
culpability categories-although, of course, there will be
outlyers in both groups. In short, the predispositions and be-
havioral characteristics that are associated with the developmen-
tal stage of adolescence support a policy of reduced culpability
for this category of offenders.
The developmental evidence supports the argument of the
post-Gault reformers of the 1970s and 1980s that a presumptive
" The assumption of traditionalists that individual juveniles do not bear responsi-
bility for their criminal acts is extremely offensive to those advocating tough policies.
For example, Alfred Regnery describes derisively a report of the Carter Administra-
tion'sJustice Department that attributes delinquency to the effect of large impersonal
institutions such as schools, social service agencies, employment channels, and courts
on youthful development. See Regnery, supra note 47, at 65.
,' See id. at 68. (observing that "there is no reason that society should be more le-
nient with a 16-year-old first offender than a 30-year-old first offender").
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diminished responsibility standard be applied to juveniles.
Moreover, other dimensions of the developmental picture
strengthen the argument for reduced accountability. Because
of inexperience and immature judgment, youths will make
many mistakes during this period. Thus, as Franklin Zimring
has argued, adolescence can usefully be conceptualized as a
probationary period, in which young decision-makers learn to
make responsible choices, without bearing the full costs of their
mistakes. This approach argues for a legal response to crime
that signals that choices have consequences, and that bad behav-
ior is punished, but not as severely as is appropriate with older
offenders (who have been given the opportunity to learn to
make better choices) .
Not surprisingly perhaps, some of these themes can be dis-
cerned in responses to adult offenders whose conduct suggests
reduced culpability. The behavioral traits and inexperience
that in general characterize youthful offenders as a group may
be relevant for grading purposes at sentencing of individual
adult criminals. The "immature" offender, whose acts were in-
fluenced by others, who is a first offender, or who "made a mis-
take" out of inexperience and can be expected to have "learned
her lesson," may receive a reduced sentence, based on an offi-
cial judgment that her crime is less culpable and deserves less
punishment than does that of a seasoned criminal. 4 1 In the case
"' See ZimmNG, supra note 26, at 89-90. Zimring uses the metaphor of the learners
permit to capture this probationary period.
17 Id. at 5 ("To impose full responsibility because adolescents have begun to make
life choices is much like expecting every new bride to be an instant Betty Crocker. It
isn't realistic and it isn't fair."). Zimring also observed that "[equal treatment for
wrong-doing seems inappropriate to the transitional status of the [adolescent] ...
who must be protected from the full burden of adult responsibilities, but pushed
along by degrees toward the moral and legal accountability that we consider appro-
priate to adulthood." Id. at 96. This approach also underscores the flawed founda-
tion of the rehabilitative model ofjuvenile justice, in its premise that punishment was
inappropriate.
14 VON HIRscH, supra note 16. Evidence of this kind is routinely presented at sen-
tencing under indeterminate sentencing prescriptions. It is also the kind of evidence
that would be deemed important in a capital sentencing proceeding. See Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597 (1978) (in capital sentencing, court, in imposing sentence,
must be allowed to consider, "as mitigating factors character, prior record, age....
and... relatively minor part in the crime"); cf. 28 U.S.CA. § 994 (West 1996). Under
the determinate approach of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, factors such as the
offender's role in the offense can be taken into account in sentencing. Section
1B1.3(b) of the Guidelines links the determination of a sentence to the relevant con-
duct of the defendant in commission of the offense. See RoDGERW. HAINES, FEDERAL
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of adults, lesser punishment acknowledges an individual defi-
ciency, a failure to attain an adult level of maturity and experi-
ence. For utilitarian reasons, however, such leniency will be
cautiously exercised, lest the presumption of free will would
completely collapse. Most adults are presumed to act on the ba-
sis of individual values and preferences. With minors, in con-
trast, criminal choices are presumed less to express individual
preferences and more to reflect the behavioral influences char-
acteristic of a transitory developmental stage that are generally
shared with others in the age cohort. This difference supports
drawing a line based on age, and subjecting adolescents to a
categorical presumption of reduced responsibility. 9
B. A SOCIAL COST PERSPECTIVE ONJUVENILE CRIME
Contrary to what we have called the "utilitarian assumption"
underlying current policies, a developmental perspective sug-
gests that the goal of crime reduction is also served by attending
to developmental dimensions of criminal behavior. In the cur-
rent climate of public anxiety about violent youth, many poli-
cymakers are persuaded that society must treat immature
youthful offenders as a class more severely because of the mag-
SENTENCING GUIDEIjNES HANDBOOK: TEXT AND ANALYsis 61 (1997). The commentary
stresses that "the focus is on the specific acts and omissions for which the defendant is
to be held accountable ...." Id. That the offender is a career criminal is a basis for
increasing the sentence. Id. at 553 (§ 4A); id. at 604 (§ 4B1.3). Although the defini-
tion of "career offender" includes only persons who were at least 18-years-old at the
time of the instant offense, id. at 590 (§ 4B1.1), the Guidelines provide for taking into
account at sentencing defendant's offenses committed prior to age 18, regardless of
whether the defendant was tried as an adult or in the juvenile justice system. Id. at
562 (§ 4A1.2(d)).
19 As the text suggests, if diminished responsibility defenses are not available to
these offenders, the distinction can be justified in part on their greater opportunity
over time to develop mature judgment. This view was supported in In re Causey, 363
So. 2d 472, 476 (La. 1978):
[M]any juveniles, "sane" as well as "insane," "normal" as well as "retarded," are
incompetent to assist in their own defense, at least by normal adult standards.
This, indeed, is a large part of the rationale for the special juvenile system.
Where ajuvenile is "incompetent" primarily because of his tender years, it might
be unnecessary and perhaps unwise to substitute the full-dress examinations and
hearings designed for adult incompetents ....
However, according to Grisso, this view was seldom, if ever, articulated by other
courts. Grisso, supra note 25, at 9. Ultimately, the case for applying a presumption of
reduced culpability to juveniles, but not making such a standard available to adults on
an individual basis is justified most persuasively on utilitarian grounds. See supra notes
141-44; infra notes 157-64.
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nitude of social harm caused by juvenile offenders. ° A devel-
opmental perspective reveals that, despite its superficial appeal,
this position is short-sighted, even in terms of the reformers' ob-
jectives. On purely instrumentalist grounds, effective policy will
attend to the developmental character of much youth crime,
and to the divergent patterns of offending represented by the
two groups described earlier-those youths whose criminal be-
havior is limited to adolescence, and those whose delinquency is
part of a life-course persistent pattern.
1. The Instrumentalist Argument for Tough Sanctions
Political arguments for tough juvenile sanctions combine a
retributive claim that juvenile and adult offenders deserve
analogous punishment, with a utilitarian argument that such
policies will reduce crime. Even if a strong claim that the
criminal choices of adolescents and adults are the same is re-
jected, as we have suggested it should be, many are ready to dis-
count the extent and relevance of developmental differences in
assessing criminal responsibility. 5' Although only the most fer-
vent advocates of punitive policies are comfortable punishing
children, regardless of age, like their adult counterparts, 152 many
more conclude that the principles limiting criminal punishment
'0 Several statistics support the view that youth violence inflicts significant social
costs. The National Crime Victimization Survey in 1991 found that juveniles commit-
ted 28% of crimes against persons. See Delbert Elliott, Youth Violence: An Overview,
Center for the Study of Youth Policy, Univ. of Pennsylvania (1993). Rates of violent
juvenile crime, particularly homicide have increased dramatically in recent years. See
discussion supra note 4; see also HowARD SNYDER & BARBARA SicEmUN, JuVNLE
OFFENDERs & VIcniMS: NATONAL REPORT, NAT'L CENTER OF JVENE JuSTICE (1995);
Barbara Allen-Hagen & Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles and Violence: Offending and Vwtimi-
zation, Juv. JUST. DIG., Aug. 4, 1994, at 1; Glenn Pierce & James Alan Fox, Recent
Trends in Violent Crime: A Closer Look (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Northeastern Univ. Dep't of Criminology).
15' VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 49; Regnery, supra note 47; Dowie, supra note 48.
Virginia's Governor George Allen, in promoting a bill in the state legislature that
would automatically treat youths of 14 and older charged with murder or rape as
adults, said that such youths "know the difference between right and wrong. This will
send the message that we're notjust going to give you a slap on the wrist for commit-
ting violent felonies." Peter Baker, Vrginia Bill Takes Hard Line on Youth Crime, WASH.
PoST, Feb. 1, 1996, at 1-2. Allen initially proposed trying every violentjuvenile age 14
and over as an adult, but he withdrew this proposal to get legislative passage. Id. The
compromise legislation combined the harsh punishment advocated by Republicans
with rehabilitative components. Id.
15 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the reaction to the killing
by I1-year-old Robert 'Yummy" Sandifer).
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are not unduly strained by ignoring the impact of immaturity on
adolescent criminal choices.15
3
In the current climate, any modest developmental claim for
leniency seems to be far outweighed by the importance of re-
ducing the social threat of adolescent crime. In general, the
criminal law balances autonomy-based constraints on retribu-
tion against the social cost of excusing conduct that inflicts
harm. How the balance is struck depends in part on the magni-
tude of the perceived harm. Many observers believe that, al-
though youthful immaturity may have served to justify a
differential response to the criminal conduct of minors in a
more peaceful time, "s today the stakes are too high to retain a
system that sacrifices social protection. 156 In response to the evi-
dence that violent youth crime has escalated in recent years, s5
the recent legal reforms have shifted the balance toward greater
social protection.
From an instrumentalist perspective, the argument against
counting youth as a mitigating factor in applying criminal sanc-
tions seems to be even more compelling, because the develop-
mental factors at issue are likely to contribute to the inclination
to commit crimes. On this view, if adolescents tend to be risk-
preferring actors who discount future consequences in favor of
immediate gratification, they present a greater threat than do
older offenders, and the social interest in constraint is more
compelling., 8 Through this lens, a system that responds leni-
... As we have suggested, by mid-adolescence the impact of developmental factors
on decision-making is not analogous to the distortions of perception and cognition
caused by severe mental illness that is required to support an insanity defense. Thus,
many may find the differences relatively insubstantial. See supra notes 142-44 and ac-
companying text.
' Thus, only negligence or recklessness must be shown to establish mens rea for
most crimes. To require that the defendant's purpose to cause the harm be proven
would exclude too many offenders. See, e.g.,'MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962).
155 SeeDaly, supra note 48, atAl.
155 Thus immaturity is treated as analogous to poverty, inadequate socialization by
parents, or emotional distress. All may contribute to criminal choices but are not ex-
culpatory on social cost grounds, since large numbers of offenders would be affected.
In contrast, only a handful of offenders are excused by reason of insanity. See
STEADMAN ETAL., supra note 143, at 50-53.
,17 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. This trend has been linked to the wide-
spread availability of guns. See GUIDE, supra note 4.
15 Demographic data supports that 16-year-olds commit more crime than any
other age cohort. A rapid decline begins at age 17. See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 675;
Mulvey & Aber, supra note 67, at 100.
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ently to its most dangerous offenders appears to be muddled
and inefficient.
2. Utilitarian Policies Through a Developmental Lens
The assumption underlying the current trend holds that a
rigorously punitive approach is the optimal means to accom-
plish the goal of reducing the social cost of youth crime. At one
level the "cure" seems promising, given the objectives. Young
offenders who are incarcerated in prison cannot be on the
streets committing crimes. The developmental analysis in Part
II, however, suggests that the utilitarian assumption is flawed
and that punitive policies may not be the optimal means to limit
the costs ofjuvenile crime.
A policy response designed to minimize social cost will rec-
ognize the substantial societal interest in facilitating desistance
in delinquents whose crimes are adolescence-limited, and in
preserving their future prospects. Most delinquent youths will
grow into useful (or at least not criminal) citizens if they survive
this stage without destroying their life chances. When and
whether they emerge into productive adulthood is likely to be at
least in part a function of the system's response to their adoles-
cent criminal conduct. 9 It seems likely, although it has not
been demonstrated, that categorically imposing adult criminal
penalties on adolescents will increase the likelihood that they
will become career criminals, or at least that it may delay desis-
tance."6 Moreover, even if desistance is not directly affected by
a criminal sentence, the future educational, employment and
social productivity of those youths whose crimes are adolescent-
limited behavior is likely to be negatively affected, either directly
or indirectly.161 Policy that attends to this developmental pattern
"' Moffitt suggests that desistance of antisocial behavior may be delayed if access to
conventional adult roles is impeded as a result of the delinquent conduct. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
" SeeJeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantages ofJuvenile Verses Criminal Court Sanc-
tion on Recidivism among Adolescent Felony Offenders, J.L. & Soc. POLY (forthcoming
Winter 1997). The difficulties in studying these effects are daunting. What is needed
is controlled longitudinal research in which youths are randomly assigned adult
criminal and juvenile penalties. Further, the juvenile intervention must not be
equivalently punitive; ideally, it would be tailored to provide "room to reform." Re-
cidivism and other productivity measures would then be studied over a number of
years.
16' The direct impact involves time spent in prison by individuals who have ma-
tured and no longer represent a threat. It also involves the response of employers,
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would give these delinquent minors "room to reform," protect-
ing them from the most severe consequences of choices based
on immature judgment.62
A modest claim, based on our developmental analysis, is
that the broad use of adult criminal penalties against youths
may carry social costs that currently are being left out of the cal-
culus, when such penalties are applied to normative adolescent
offenders. The social benefits that proponents of tough penal-
ties promise are not likely to be realized because two assump-
tions underlying the policies appear to be erroneous: that most
youths who commit serious crimes are young career criminals;
and that adult penalties will not generate severe iatrogenic ef-
fects that harm those who would otherwise outgrow their incli-
nation to engage in criminal conduct.
As to the small group of delinquents whose conduct is likely
to persist into adulthood, the picture is quite different. The re-
search suggests that many adolescents in this group are likely to
offend at an earlier age,163 and that their criminal conduct is
frequent, chronic and more likely to be violent than is that of
their delinquent peers.1r Thus, purely on social cost grounds,
early and severe punitive sanctions may seem to be justified
once a "differential diagnosis" identifies an offender as belong-
ing to this group.6 5 However, such a response may be short-
sighted, even aside from the formidable problem of false posi-
tive identification given our current level of knowledge,'6 6 and
educational institutions and others to a criminal record. The indirect impact involves
whatever lasting psychological effects of the prison experience and record have on
the individual's choices, goals, and identity after release.
J2 ZIMRING, supra note 36, at 7, 79-81. See also ZIMRING, supra note 26, at 73, 91 (de-
veloping this idea further).
163 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
' A frequently quoted statistic that brings this point home is that 5-6% of chronic
offenders commit over 50% of crime. See, e.g., D. FARRINGTON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
AND CONTROLLING CRIME (1986); see also WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 58, at 88 (6% of
offenders commit over 50% of crimes).
163 Moffitt argues that such a diagnosis may be possible through an examination of
pre-adolescent behavior, since life-course-persistent offenders are far more likely to
have a long history of troublesome childhood behavior, such as behavioral problems
in school, learning problems, etc. Moffitt, supra note 9, at 678.
'66 Other than early onset of antisocial behavior, few clear indicators identify of-
fenders as life-course persistent versus adolescence-limited delinquents. For example,
although early adolescent offenders are more likely to engage in violent offenses than
are adolescents who first offend in mid-adolescence, violent offenses are not typical of
either group, and some adolescence-limited offenders also commit violent crimes. See
id. at 691, 695. Thus, violent offending, per se, would not be helpful to a clinician or
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the moral constraints on punishment of the youngest offend-
ers. The enormous social cost inflicted by a lifelong career in
crime-or by lifelong incarceration-argues for continuing to
invest in developing early and comprehensive remedial inter-
ventions. Although knowledge currently is inadequate to the
task, and simple prescriptions seem unlikely, a long-term strat-
egy for dealing with this group that relies only on incarceration
is not likely to be effective.
This conclusion does not signify that the optimal legal re-
sponse to youth crime is "benign neglect." Although some soci-
ologists have advocated a minimalist approach to intervention as
the best means to avoid turning delinquents into career crimi-
nals,168 this is not a desirable response on several grounds. First,
the prediction on which it is premised is simply wrong as ap-
plied to life-course-persistent offenders, the group threatening
the greatest harm. As to the larger group of adolescent offend-
ers, lessons in accountability are important. As Franklin Zim-
ring has argued, adolescents need to learn from their foolish
youthful choices so that they can successfully assume adult
roles.1 69
IV. LESSONS FORJUVENILEJUSTICE PoucY
The analysis to this point suggests that a developmental per-
spective may be usefully employed in formulating legal re-
sponses to juvenile crime. In this part, we will sketch a few
policy lessons that we take from the analysis, and suggest direc-
tions for future innovation and research. Our aim is not to pro-
vide a detailed policy blueprint, but rather to suggest the
court in making a differential diagnosis. Moreover, although early onset of criminal
conduct is a good predictor, only 45% of teens who first offend before age 11 will go
on to become life-course criminals. SeeElliott, supra note 64, at 14.
167 See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. Moreover, as we have indicated,
the youngest offenders, who may be least appropriately subject to punishment on re-
tributive grounds, are perhaps-most likely to become careerists. Substantial research
evidence indicates that age of first arrest is a good predictor of future criminal career.
Life-course-persistent delinquents tend to be arrested at a younger age than their
adolescence-limited delinquent counterparts. Rolf Loeber & Thomas Dishion, Early
Predictors of Male Delinquency: A Review, 94 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 68, 78-79 (1983); Mulvey &
La Rosa, supra note 65, at 213; WOLFGANG ETAL., supra note 58, at 103.
'6' The identification and labeling of youths as delinquent, on this view, is self-
reinforcing. EDWIN M. ScHuR, RADIcAL NONINTERVENTION: RETHIXING TmE
DELINQUENCY PROBLEM (1973).
"' See ZIMRING, supra note 26, at 89-90.
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contours of a system for responding to juvenile crime that is in-
formed by developmental knowledge. We accept as a starting
point that a central objective of any viable contemporary system
is to reduce the social cost of youth crime, through means that
conform to conventional limits on retribution and notions of
procedural fairness. These goals function as constraints on the
generation of policies under a developmental model of juvenile
justice.
We take three core points from the developmental psychol-
ogy evidence to be of potential importance to juvenile justice
policy. First, on average, adolescents' decision-making abilities,
especially related to judgment, have not matured to a level
characteristic of adults. This gap is likely to be substantial with
younger teens, and, for this group, is likely to include greater
differences in understanding and reasoning as well as judgment.
These differences are important both to culpability and to com-
petence to stand trial. Second, younger adolescent offenders
are likely to present a higher risk of becoming career criminals
than are teens who initiate criminal conduct in mid-
adolescence. And finally, delinquent behavior itself is shaped by
developmental influences, and most adolescents desist as they
age. The following sections suggest some ways in which an op-
timal legal response to youth crime will attend to these devel-
opmental considerations.
A. RESPONDING TO CRIMES OF YOUNGER ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS
1. Limiting Criminal Court Jurisdiction
The developmental evidence supports a conclusion that, as
a general matter, younger teens are sufficiently different from
adults in cognitive and psychosocial development that they
should not be tried or punished in the adult criminal justice sys-
tem. First, the argument for diminished responsibility is more
compelling as applied to younger teens. Subjecting thirteen-
year-old offenders to the same criminal punishment that is im-
posed on adults offends the principles that define the bounda-
ries of criminal responsibility. Beyond this, the research
indicates a substantial risk that many (perhaps most) younger
adolescents may be substantially less competent to stand trial
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than are their adult counterparts. 17° Thus, concerns about pro-
cedural fairness and about diminished culpability both point in
the direction of a categorical exclusion of younger adolescents
from adult criminal adjudication.
The procedural fairness issue deserves further comment.
The debate about juvenile justice reform has rarely focussed on
this dimension of the trend toward trying ever-younger defen-
dants as adults. Upon reflection, it presents formidable prob-
lems. The prohibition against trying incompetent defendants
historically has been raised in cases involving mentally ill defen-
dants, who, upon a finding of incompetence to stand trial, typi-
cally are hospitalized so that they may be restored to
172
competence. It is quite unclear what should happen to a
youthful defendant who is unable to participate adequately in
his defense due to developmental immaturity. Should the
criminal adjudication be suspended for some indefinite period
of time until he matures? During the intervening period,
should he be confined, even though he has not been convicted
of a crime? If not, what is the alternative? The questions posed
suggest the difficult issues that will arise if younger adolescents
are routinely subject to adult criminal adjudication. It seems far
wiser to minimize the problem by categorically excluding from
adult criminal adjudication younger teens, whose immaturity is
most likely to impair their competence to function as defen-
dants in criminal courts.
2. Recognizing and Responding to High-Risk Juveniles
The conclusion that younger teens, because of their imma-
turity, should not be subject to criminal adjudication and pun-
ishment does not mean that a minimalist response to their
offenses is indicated. As we have indicated, young adolescent
171 See review of research in Grisso, supra note 125; see also authorities cited supra
notes 127, 130.
" It is premature (given the status of the research) to be prescriptive about the
minimum age for criminal adjudication, and to an extent, of course, the line will de-
pend on how much difference between youths and adults society is willing to tolerate.
In our view, until age 15, developmental differences (based on current knowledge)
are sufficient to raise substantial issues of procedural and substantive fairness.
172 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 169.1 (Michie 1995). Once restored to competence,
the defendant stands trial. Id. Procedures for evaluating defendants for competence
to stand trial and for dealing with those who are found incompetent are regulated by
statute.
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offenders are at considerably greater risk of becoming chronic
serious offenders than are those whose delinquency begins a few
years later,173 because the criminal conduct of these younger
teens is less likely to be part of a typical developmental process
that will progress to a stage of natural recovery and desistance.
Their behavior is more likely to reflect a nascent personality
disorder, developing over time through the interaction of indi-
vidual vulnerabilities and environmental factors. 17 4 Currently,
when younger teens first offend, we cannot discern those who
will proceed to criminal careers. Further research is needed to
distinguish these youths from young juveniles whose crimes re-
flect transient developmental influences. s  Nonetheless, pre-
adolescent and early adolescent criminal conduct is a suffi-
ciently important predictor so as to place these youths in a high-
risk category that warrants serious attention.17 6
It is in responding to these young offenders that a revital-
ized concept of rehabilitation is important in a contemporary
model of juvenile justice. Rehabilitative interventions with pre-
adolescent and young adolescent offenders should be far more
'73 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Loeber provides ample evidence
from numerous studies of what he calls the "early onset hypothesis," which holds that
youths who begin criminal activity in preadolescence and early adolescence are at
more risk for a delinquent career than those who start later. This group has a higher
crime rate (number of convictions), commit more serious offenses and have longer
careers. Rolf Loeber, The Stability of Antisocial and Delinquent Child Behavior: A Review,
53 CHILD DEv. 1431, 1437-39 (1982). See also Moffitt, supra note 9, at 683-84 (describ-
ing the childhood pattern of antisocial behavior in life-course persistent offenders);
Elliott, supra note 64, at 14.
174 Moffitt offers an account of the early stages of this process. The young child
who has neuropsychological deficits that make him difficult to manage may have par-
ents who are poorly equipped to respond in a beneficial corrective way. Instead,
problem behavior at home and at school is reinforced and negative responses con-
tribute to failure to acquire adequate academic and social skills. See Moffitt, supra
note 9, at 683-84.
' Research indicates that factors such as the age of onset, and variety and fre-
quency of problem behavior are linked to its stability and persistence and that
chronic offenders are likely to have a history of antisocial behavior going back to early
childhood. Loeber, supra note 173, at 1431-32; Moffitt, supra note 9, at 677-78. The
problem is that we cannot yet predict which of those young offenders who present
this pattern will become adult criminals. For an effort to build on the typology, and
to develop criteria for identifying children who will become chronic offenders, for
treatment purposes, see Donald Lynam, Early Identification of Chronic Offenders: Who are
the FledglingPsychopaths?, 120 PSYCHOL. BULL. 209 (1996). Lynam argues that children
who manifest hyperactivity-impulsivity-attention deficit disorder together with con-
duct problems are at high risk for future chronic offending. Id. at 214.
"71 See authorities cited supra in note 167.
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intensive than has been the traditional response. Indeed, in
some sense, the traditional dispositional regime has it back-
wards, in its tendency to intervene minimally with younger of-
fenders and more assertively with older adolescents. Thus, a
response that waits until these offenders are older and identi-
fied as chronic violent offenders misses the opportunity to
remediate at a point when the possibility for rehabilitation is
more promising than it will be later.1 78
It is fair to say that we have not yet developed effective re-
habilitative interventions for these very young offenders, al-
though a few delinquency programs have reported promising
results in recent years.17 On the other hand, we also have not
yet invested substantially in developing intensive and compre-
hensive interventions directed at the multiple problems that
these youths face. Such an effort requires a serious long-term
commitment of societal resources, and until it is undertaken, it
cannot be said that "nothing works." s° Given the long term so-
cial cost of failure to make the investment-costs that include
both the wasted lives of these youths and the harm they inflict
on society-it seems well worth it.
In our view, these comprehensive interventions should ex-
plicitly be part of the response to juvenile crime, though the in-
terventions may have educational, mental health, and social
service components. Investment in intensive rehabilitative in-
terventions that is closely linked to public protection from juve-
nile crime may be more palatable to legislators and to the
'" This response makes sense, of course, if the sole purpose of intervention is ret-
ribution.
7 By age 18, antisocial personality disorder is well established and prospects for
rehabilitation are very poor. See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 684; Loeber, supra note 173,
at 1431-32.
'7 See David Tate et al., VolentJuvenile Delinquents: Treatment Effectiveness and Implica-
tions for Future Action, 50 AM. PSYcHOLOGisT 777, 779 (1995). These authors found
that multisystemic therapy (MST) shows promise with violent young offenders. This
therapy seems promising as a model for the kind of comprehensive intervention that
could be effective with life-course-persistent offenders. It is directed at solving the
youth's multiple problems in many contexts-family, peers, school and neighbor-
hood. Follow-up studies at two and four years suggested that offenders who partici-
pated in MST had a lower arrest rate and self report rate than the control group. See
Scott W. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation Using Multisystemic Treatment: Long-Term
Followup to a Clinical Trial with Serious Violent Offenders, 2 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 283
(1983).
", Robert Martinson, What Works: Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB.
INTERsr 22 (1974).
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public. Some proposals for juvenile justice reform have com-
bined a "get tough" response to juvenile crime with recommen-
dations for an investment in comprehensive services to younger
children who demonstrate problem behaviors."' It is surely true
that a long-term solution requires such an investment. The
problem is that, in the political process, the punitive policies
survive and proposals for funding comprehensive services for
younger children may never be implemented. A first step is to
reinforce the link between social protection through crime re-
duction and intensive rehabilitation of very young offenders.
If comprehensive remediation efforts are unsuccessful, at
some point society's interests in protection will dominate in de-
termining the legal response. However, since rehabilitative in-
tervention with persistently antisocial youths is unlikely to result
in a "quick fix," this determination of failure should not be
made prematurely. A commitment to rehabilitation reinforces
the constraints on punishment of young offenders that we have
described, making a powerful case against subjecting fourteen-
year-old repeat offenders to adult criminal punishment.
B. INTERVENTIONS WITH ADOLESCENCE-LIMITED OFFENDERS
An important insight of the developmental analysis is that
neither the rehabilitative model (with its treatment focus) nor
the criminal justice model (with its single minded focus on pun-
ishment) provides the conceptual tools to respond effectively to
a large category of adolescent offenders: those whose first of-
fenses occur in the mid-adolescent years. In the contemporary
context, the most important practical implication of adopting
the developmental framework is the recognition that severe
sanctions imposed on adolescents whose crimes reflect transient
developmental influences are unlikely to serve the interest of ei-
ther society or of offenders. In policy terms, this should trans-
late into a presumption against adult criminal adjudication and
sanctions for first offenses by these juveniles, even for serious
crimes. Contrary to the assumption of current law, if reducing
social cost is important, the case for this more "lenient" re-
sponse holds as powerfully for older (and thus presumably more
competent) youths as for younger adolescents. Indeed, as we
have demonstrated, the mid-adolescent first offender with no
'l See REPORT OF THE VA COMM'N OFYOUTH, supra note 4.
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prior history of problem behavior is less likely than his younger
counterpart (especially with such a history) to represent a sub-
stantial threat to society later in adulthood.
Under a developmental model, delinquency interventions
directed at adolescents whose crimes are likely to reflect tran-
sient developmental influences serve multiple purposes. First, a
developmental model recognizes the importance of lessons in
accountability; slaps on the wrist fail to serve this purpose. Sec-
ond (and linked to the first), the objective of protecting society
would not be discounted. The fact that many youthful offend-
ers will desist in their criminal activity as they mature does not
justify a license to offend during adolescence. Third, the sys-
temic response would be tailored to protect rather than to dam-
age the prospects for a productive future of adolescents whose
desistance is probable.
The future opportunities of juvenile offenders can be pro-
tected in several ways, including some that were designed to
serve this purpose under the traditional juvenile justice system.
Thus, policies of maintaining the anonymity of juvenile defen-
dants in the press and of giving accused juveniles the right to
choose a closed hearing may limit the stigma of delinquency
status and its lasting impact.8 2 The sealing of juvenile justice re-
cords reduces the likelihood that the young adult who has de-
sisted from crime will be haunted by the mistakes of his youth in
employment and educational contexts. 3 Dispositional pro-
grams that emphasize education and the acquisition ofjob skills
will encourage future productivity and may facilitate the process
of assuming adult roles.
The developmental model also suggests directions for fu-
ture innovations in juvenile justice research and policy. First,
's Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access to Juvenile Proceedings, 68
TEMp. L. REv. 1897, 1901 (1996).
" For an example of the impact of publicity on a juvenile's future, consider the
much publicized case of Gina Grant, whose admission to Harvard University was
withdrawn when Harvard learned that she had withheld information (or dissembled)
about the fact that she had killed her mother at age 14. The information came from
media coverage of the story. Some observers were troubled by the fact that Gina had
received no punishment for her offense, and perhaps viewed the later sanction as
modest punishment. See Student Who Killed Her Mother Loses Offer From Harvard,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 1995, at A04.
On the other hand, societal protection justifies access to juvenile records if the
criminal conduct persists in adulthood.
1997]
SCOTT & GRISSO
criminological research to date has focused on the etiology of
delinquency; little attention has been directed toward the proc-
ess of "maturing out" of delinquency or of the mechanisms that
contribute to desistance.1' The developmental framework clari-
fies the importance of seeking to understand this process and of
beginning to develop interventions that may accelerate desis-
tance-or at a minimum that do not delay the process.185
A very different type of policy initiative would draw on de-
velopmental knowledge about adolescent decision-making to
structure incentives that could discourage participation in
criminal activity. Currently, we can only hypothesize about the
influences on decision-making in this context, based on knowl-
edge of traits that shape adolescent choices in other settings.
However, a better understanding of the process by which ado-
lescents make choices to participate in crime could be useful in
formulating prophylactic responses. Indeed, some current poli-
cies seem to be directed toward deterrence, based on intuitions
about the influences affecting juvenile choices. For example,
curfew regulations discourage youths from gathering together
at night, partly in recognition of the role that peer influence
may have on individual choice. A more sophisticated under-
standing of decision-making may contribute to more effective
efforts to influence youthful choices about involvement in
crime.
C. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN A SEPARATE SYSTEM
The most effective means to implement the lessons from
developmental psychology is to maintain a system of adjudica-
tion and disposition that is separate from the adult criminaljus-
tice system. First, a juvenile court can better recognize and
accommodate the reduced culpability and more limited trial
competence of younger offenders. Moreover, a separate juve-
nile correctional system is more likely to utilize dispositional
strategies, goals, and approaches that are grounded in devel-
opmental knowledge. Commitment to the development of in-
84 See Mulvey & Aber, supra note 67; see also David Farrington et al., A 24 Year Fol-
low-Up of Men From Vulnerable Backgrounds, in THE ABANDONMENT OF DELINQUENT
BEHAVIOR, supra note 67, at 155.
... If Moffitt's theory holds, programs that prepare delinquents for adult roles may
facilitate the process of desistance of antisocial behavior. See Moffitt, supra note 9, at
690-95.
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tensive rehabilitative interventions for young offenders and to
the protection of the future prospects of youths whose crimes
are adolescent-limited offers the long term promise of lowering
the social cost of youth crime more effectively than the blanket
punitive policies that are currently in vogue. We think that it is
unlikely that either juvenile offenders or society will be better
served by a unified criminal justice system-even one that treats
minors more leniently for sentencing purposes. 86 The ability or
inclination of the criminal justice system to tailor its response to
juvenile crime so as to utilize the lessons of developmental psy-
chology is questionable. The evidence suggests that political
pressure functions as a one-way ratchet, in the direction of ever-
stiffer penalties. Programs designed for adolescents and sen-
tencing distinctions between adults and juveniles will be much
harder to maintain in a unified system in which juveniles are
otherwise treated as adults; it seems predictable that the lines
between age groups will become blurred.
The argument for separate treatment of juvenile offenders
becomes weaker when the offender is older and persists in seri-
ous criminal activity. Policies regarding the adjudication of
chronic serious adolescent offenders in the criminal justice sys-
tem are subject to considerable debate, which generally reflects
political and ideological differences. The empirical evidence
and theoretical insights from developmental psychology and
criminology provide no answers about the contours of an opti-
mal policy. For a broad range of juvenile offenders however,
utilitarian and retributive arguments converge to support adju-
dication and disposition in a separate juvenile justice system.
Such a system, grounded in developmental principles, not only
can function more coherently and effectively to achieve the
complex societal objectives at stake, but also stands as a power-
ful symbol that most young offenders are different from their
adult counterparts.
'86See Feld, supra note 55.
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